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FELONY MURDER AND THE MISDEMEANOR
OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPE: A LEGISLATIVE
ERROR IN SEARCH OF CORRECTION
Peter J. McQuillan*
I. Introduction
The felony murder doctrine defines as murder any death occurring
in the course of a felony without regard to whether the death was
the result of accident, negligence, recklessness or purpose.' Hence,
a person is guilty of murder if he is criminally responsible for the
underlying felony. 2 Since this doctrine requires no proof of any
culpability with respect to the victim's death, the crime of felony
murder is one of strict or absolute liability.
Commentators have criticized the felony murder concept almost
from its inception as a harsh legal doctrine with insufficient policy
justifications and theoretical underpinnings.' While a substantial body
of criticism supports the abolition of the doctrine, it continues in
effect-although significantly modified in scope-in the vast majority
of states, including New York. 4
A recent articles suggests that the infirmities of this doctrine may
have reached constitutional stature. 6 Consider the following hypo-
* Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial District.
Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordhamn University School of Law; B.S., 1951,
Long Island University; LL.B., 1954, Fordham University School of Law; LL.M.,
1958, New York Law School.
1. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Gegan, Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law,
12 N.Y.L. FORUM 565, 586-87 (1965) [hereinafter Gegan]. See generally Rikard,
The Uncertain Status of the Felony Murder Rule in Massachussetts After Com-
monwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 436 N.E.2d 400 (1982), 6 W. NEwXENGLAND
L. REv. 1081 (1984); Saltzman, Does Michigan Have a Felony Murder Rule, 59
MICH. BAR J. 97 (Feb. 1980); Seibold, The Felony Murder Rule: In Search of a
Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133 (1978) [hereinafter Seibold]; Sudduth, The Dillon
Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony Murder Punishment, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1299
(1984); Violette, The Felony Murder Rule and the Death Penalty: Enmund v.
Florida-Overreaching by the Supreme Court, 19 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 255 (1984).
4. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
5. Roth & Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985) [hereinafter Roth & Sundby].
6. See id. The authors made this observation:
Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great
a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes
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thetical: Arthur T. Waterhouse, a fifty-seven year old cashier at a
Manhattan restaurant embezzles $300 from his employer on February
26, 1986. When Waterhouse's employer discovers the theft he notifies
the police. Officer Tracy arrives at the restaurant and, after formally
arresting Waterhouse for the felony of grand larceny in the third
degree, 7 places him in the back seat of the patrol car.
Never having had any prior contact with the law, Waterhouse
panics and attempts escape by opening the door of the police car
when it stops for a traffic light. Officer Tracy forcefully restrains
Waterhouse and successfully prevents him from escaping.
Tracy, however, as a direct result of this trauma, suffers a massive
heart attack. Other police officers quickly arrive at the scene. The
police transport Waterhouse to the precinct where they book him
for the class E felony of grand larceny in the third degree' and the
class A misdemeanor of attempted escape in the second degree. 9
Tracy is promptly taken to the emergency room of a nearby hospital
and dies three hours later.
Under the literal language of the present New York Penal Law,
Waterhouse can be convicted of murder in the second degree 0 and
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than fifteen years to life.1"
This irrational and grotesque result-which the legislature patently
did not intend"2-is the product of the felony murder doctrine.
It has been commonly understood that the conduct immediately
preceding the homicidal act must constitute a felony. 3 If the actor's
antecedent conduct constitutes only a misdemeanor, neither he nor
an accomplice would be guilty of felony murder.14 Nevertheless, in
New York, because of a legislative drafting error, it is indeed possible
a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a
legal doctrine: it has been described as "astonishing" and "monstrous,"
an unsupportable "legal fiction," "an unsightly wart on the skin of the
criminal law," and as an "anachronistic remnant" that has " 'no logical
or practical basis for existence in modern law.' " Perhaps the most that
can be said for the rule is that it provides commentators with an extreme
example that makes it easy to illustrate the injustice of various legal
propositions.
Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
7. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.30 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 205.10 (McKinney 1975).
10. Id. § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
11. See generally id. (Sentence Chart I).
12. See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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for a person to be convicted of felony murder when his antecedent
crime was only a misdemeanor. 5
The felony murder doctrine has been part of the statutory. law
of New York since 1829.16 The legislature later incorporated it with
some modifications in the Revised Penal Law of 1967.1' A cursory
reading of New York's felony murder provision suggests that the
legislature enumerated nine felonies,18 since the first four enumerated
felonies are all crimes of degree.' 9 In fact, however, the legislature
specified sixteen substantive felonies in the felony murder statute.
20
Furthermore, since the statute embraces the attempt stage 21-and an
attempt to commit a crime is a discrete crime-thirty-two offenses
may actually constitute the predicate for felony murder, i.e., the sixteen
substantive offenses and the sixteen attempt offenses. 22 In 1971, the
15. See infra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
17. 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 791, at 1313. Section 125.25(3) of that law, at the
time of its enactment, provided that a person is guilty of murder when:
Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or
attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the
first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree,
escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the
course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight
therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death
of a person other than one of the participants ....
Id. at 1314. The felony murder doctrine articulated in this quoted section expressly
embraces three separate stages with respect to the actor's underlying felonious
conduct: (1) the attempt stage; (2) the commission of the felony stage; and (3) the
stage of immediate flight from either one of the first two stages.
18. The New York Court of Appeals, in People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123,
359 N.E.2d 420, 390 N.Y.S.2d 912, observed: "The 1967 Penal Law limited the
application of the felony murder concept to nine serious and violent predicate
felonies." Id. at 128, 359 N.E.2d at 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
19. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (robbery, burglary,
kidnapping and arson).
20. See id.
21. See id. ("commits or attempts to commit").
22. See id. The 32 offenses enumerated in the felony murder statute are: (1)
robbery third degree; (2) attempted robbery third degree; (3) robbery second degree;
(4) attempted robbery second degree; (5) robbery first degree; (6) attempted robbery
first degree; (7) burglary third degree; (8) attempted burglary third degree; (9)
burglary second degree; (10) attempted burglary second degree; (11) burglary first
degree; (12) attempted burglary first degree; (13) kidnapping second degree; (14)
attempted kidnapping second degree; (15) kidnapping first degree; (16) attempted
kidnapping first degree; (17) arson third degree; (18) attempted arson third degree;
(19) arson second degree; (20) attempted arson second degree; (21) arson first
degree; (22) attempted arson first degree; (23) rape first degree; (24) attempted
rape first degree; (25) sodomy first degree; (26) attempted sodomy first degree;
(27) sexual abuse first degree; (28) attempted sexual abuse first degree; (29) escape
second degree; (30) attempted escape second degree; (31) escape first degree; and
(32) attempted escape first. degree. Id.
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legislature added two felonies to the list,23 and in 1984, the legislature
added two more felonies to the list.2
Because of a serious legislative drafting error, however, the leg-
islature included two class A misdemeanors among the thirty-six
crimes embraced within the felony murder statute. 25 Those two mis-
demeanors are attempted arson in the fourth degree26-which is
actually a non-existent crime 2 -and attempted escape in the second
degree. 28 The other thirty-four crimes are, in fact, felonies. 9
As will be demonstrated below, the legislature never intended
conduct constituting a misdemeanor to be the predicate for a felony
murder prosecution.3 ° To the contrary, this Article maintains that
the legislature unquestionably intended the actor's predicate conduct,
attempted or completed, to be in fact a felony.3
To demonstrate that it was not the intent of the legislature to
permit misdemeanor conduct to serve as the predicate for a felony
murder prosecution, this Article examines the history of the doctrine,
including: (1) the origin and development of the felony murder
doctrine at common law;32 and (2) statutory antecedents to New
York's 1967 felony murder statute33 along with the 1963-1967 reports
of the New York Law Revision Commission.3 4 The Article discusses
23. See 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 961, at 1540-41. The two felonies were arson in
the fourth degree and attempted arson in the fourth degree, which raised the total
of offenses that can constitute a predicate for felony murder to 34. The legislature
merely relabeled the existing three degrees of arson, without any change in form
or substance, as fourth, third and second degree arson and created a new crime
of arson in the first degree. Id. at 1541. Thus, the crime of arson in the third
degree became arson in the fourth degree without any change of substance or
section number.
24. See 1984 N.Y. Laws ch. 210, at 350. These two felonies were aggravated
sexual abuse and attempted aggravated sexual abuse, so that a total of 36 offenses
can now constitute a predicate for felony murder.
25. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
26. See id. § 150.05 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (arson fourth degree), § 110.05(7)
(McKinney Supp. 1987) (attempt to commit class E felony).
27. See id. § 150.05. Since the class E felony of arson in the fourth degree
requires that the actor recklessly damage a building, no crime of attempted arson
in the fourth degree can exist. See People v. Trepanier, 84 A.D.2d 374, 380, 446
N.Y.S.2d 829, 833 (4th Dep't 1982).
28. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.10 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (escape second
degree); § 110.05(7) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (attempt to commit class E felony).
29. See id. § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
30. See infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
31. See Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d at 128, 359 N.E.2d at 423-24, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
916 (1978).
32. See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
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both the principal theoretical objections to the doctrine," as well as
judicial and legislative limitations imposed upon the doctrine,"6 and
then reviews a case involving a felony murder conviction in which
the predicate offense was a misdemeanor. 7 Finally, the Article recom-
mends judicial" and legislative" action to correct the patent error
in New York's present felony murder statute.
II. Common Law Development
It is impossible to say precisely how the doctrine of felony murder
originated and developed. In an illuminating 355-page study of the
New York law of homicide from colonial times to 1937, the authors
wrote that "it is not surprising that the decisions of the English
courts and the writings of legal commentators are besprinkled with
expressions of doubt concerning the soundness and indeed the very
authenticity of the [felony murder doctrine]. 40 In addition, in 1980,
the Michigan Supreme Court observed that "[h]istorians and com-
mentators have concluded that the [felony murder doctrine]" is of
questionable origin and that the reasons for the [doctrine] no longer
exist, making it an anachronistic remnant, 'a historic survivor for
which there is no logical or practical basis for existence in modern
law.' ,,41
It appears that Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), who is generally
credited with initially reducing the common law to an orderly system,
first articulated the felony murder doctrine.4 2 The early English
common law was largely what Coke said it was. 4 Modern biographers
have noted, however, that Coke would occasionally stretch a reported
decision to conform to his rule or exaggerate the meaning or holding
of a particular decision." This flaw in scholarship was probably
responsible for Coke writing:
35. See infra notes 172-85 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 226-61 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
40. New York Law Revision Commission Study of Homicide: The Eighteenth
Century to 1937, [1937] N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 660 [hereinafter Homicide
Study].
41. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 689, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1980) (citation
omitted).
42. See E. COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 56 (1644) [hereinafter
COKE].




FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
If the act be unlawful, it is murder. As if A meaning to steale
a deere in the park of B, shooteth at the deer, and by the glance
of the arrow killeth a boy, that is hidden in a bush; this is
murder, for that the act was unlawful, although A had no intent
to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B the owner of
the park had shot at his own deer, and without any ill intent
had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been
homicide by misadventure, and no felony. 45
A distinguished historian of criminal law, "upon careful search into
Coke's authority" concluded that Coke's statement was "entirely
unwarranted by the authorities which he quotes," and characterized
it as "astonishing" and "monstrous." 6 Another commentator wrote
that Coke's hypothetical of the deer stealer "is the common law
only of Sir Edward Coke." '47 And another has characterized the
genesis of the felony murder doctrine "as a blunder by Coke in
the translation and interpretation of a passage from Bracton. ' '4 1
Nearly 120 years after the publication of Coke's Third Institute
was published, Sir Michael Foster wrote:
Accidental Homicide: In order to bring the case within this de-
scription, the act upon which death ensueth must be lawful: for
if the act be unlawful, I mean if it be malum in se, the case
will amount to felony, either murder or manslaughter, as circum-
stances may vary the nature of it. If it be done intent went no
farther than to commit a bare trespass, manslaughter: though, I
confess, Lord Coke seemeth to think otherwise.4 9
Foster, therefore, would convict a person of murder when, with the
intent to steal a chicken, he shoots at the chicken but accidentally
and without any negligence kills a person whose presence behind
45. COKE, supra note 42, at 56.
46. STEPHEN, supra note 43, at 57, 75.
47. Molsel, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453, 453 n.3 (1955)
(quoting 6 T. HOBBES, Dialogue of the Common Law, in ENGLISH WORKS 86-87
(1840)).
48. Criminal Law: Felony-Murder Rule-Felon's Responsibility for Death of Ac-
complice, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1496, 1496 n.2 (1965).
49. M. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 258 (1762) [hereinafter FOSTER]. Foster proffered
this hypothetical:
A. shooteth at the poultry of B., and by accident killeth a man; if his
intention was to steal the poultry, which must be collected from cir-
cumstances, it will be murder by reason of that felonious intent; but if
it was done wantonly and without that intention it will be barely man-
slaughter.
Id. at 258-59. The only authority cited by Foster is dictum in a 1707 case that
cited no other authority than Coke.
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the barn could not have been suspected.50 Not until Foster's work
in 1762, did a case or commentary mention a connection between
a felony and a murder.
In 1765 Blackstone adopted Foster's position on felony murder
in his Commentaries on the Laws of England:
[W]hen an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an un-
lawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according
to the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution
of a felonious intent, or in consequences naturally tended to
bloodshed, it will be murder; but, if no more was intended than
a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter. 5
It is because of Blackstone that the felony murder doctrine became
widely known in the United States at the end of the eighteenth
century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it was
Blackstone who bequeathed the felony murder doctrine to American
legislators who, after placidly accepting it, codified it in their nine-
teenth century penal laws.52 American judges also contributed to its
50. See STEPHEN, supra note 43, at 75. Stephen remarked:
Cruel and, indeed, monstrous as such an illustration may appear to us,
it is put forward by Foster as a mitigation of the views of Coke, and
such no doubt it is. It certainly is less objectionable to say that unin-
tentional homicide committed in the prosecution of a felonious design
is murder, than to say that unintentional homicide committed by any
unlawful act is murder. Foster's own illustration, however, shows clearly
that the one rule is less bad than the other, principally because it is
narrower.
Id. In 1881, United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes commented
on Foster's chicken hypothetical: "If the object of the [felony murder doctrine]
is to prevent such accidents, it should make accidental killing with firearms murder,
not accidental killing in effort to steal; while, if its object is to prevent stealing
it would do better to hang one thief in every thousand by lot." O.W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 58 (1881). One commentator recently observed that "[flor Foster, it
is essential that the 'unlawful act' be a felony, and in the view of his rationale
of transferred felonious intent, it is presumably immaterial whether the felony is
dangerous." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 282 (1978) [hereinafter
FLETCHER].
51. G. CHASE, CHASE'S BLACKSTONE 940 (4th ed. 1914).
52. FLETCHER, supra note 50, at 283. One theory suggested frequently as to why
commentators did not challenge the felony murder doctrine is that at that time
practically all felonies were punishable by death. These commentators did not know
that the execution rates varied among the capital felonies at common law. Fletcher
notes:
[This] is an example where arguing from the law on the books, rather
than the practice of the courts, can easily lead us astray. It is simply
false to say that it made no difference whether one was convicted of
larceny or of murder and that therefore there was no harm in Foster's
1987l
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development by reading the doctrine into the common law of hom-
icide, i.e., by adopting the fictions of implied malice aforethought
and constructive murder."
At the end of the eighteenth century, the common law developed
what later became known as the misdemeanor manslaughter rule,
i.e., an actor could be guilty of involuntary manslaughter if the
victim's death occurred while the actor was committing an unlawful
act not amounting to a felony. One rationale for this rule, and
perhaps for the felony murder doctrine itself, is that one who violates
the law has no moral basis to complain about being held responsible
for an unexpected and unintended result. Of course, the misdemeanor
manslaughter rule provided a rough basis for criminal responsibility
at a time before the development of the concepts of recklessness
and criminal negligence as we know them today. Many nineteenth
century courts and commentators repeatedly asserted that the felony
murder doctrine was part of the common law of England.14 Although
its origin is uncertain and doubtful," the doctrine appears to have
been critically accepted and developed simply through repetition. 6
During this time, however, English judges sought to limit the
application of the felony murder doctrine. 7 Consequently, in the
upgrading every case of larceny-causing-death to the level of murder.
Id.
53. Id. at 291-92. Fletcher asserted:
[Ilt is simply false to hold that the English common law contained a
general rule to the effect that any killing in the course of a felony was
murder .... The English case law never supported the rule of law that
one finds quoted in the American cases, namely, that any killing, even
an accidental killing, would be murder if committed in the perpetration
of a felony. Certain dangerous felonies such as rape and robbery were
linked for a period with the proof of malice [aforethought], but the
doctrine never encompassed accidental deaths incidental to felonies.
Id.
54. See STEPHEN, supra note 43, at 57.
55. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 698, 299 N.W.2d 304, 312 (1980). The court
explained:
Thus, an examination of the felony murder rule indicates that the doctrine
is of doubtful origin. Derived from the misinterpretation of case law, it
went unchallenged because of circumstances which no longer exist. The
doctrine was continuously modified and restricted in England, the country
of its birth, until its ultimate rejection by Parliament in 1957.
Id.
56. STEPHEN, supra note 43, at 57. "This astonishing doctrine has so far prevailed
as to have been recognized as part of the law of England by many subsequent
writers .... It has been repeated so often that I amongst others have not only
accepted it, though with regret, but have acted upon it." Id. (citation omitted).
57. In the much-cited case of Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox, Crim. Cas. 311 (1887),
the court instructed the jury:
[I]nstead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony
[Vol. XV
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first half of the twentieth century, English prosecutors rarely invoked
the felony murder doctrine. Indeed, Parliament abolished the doc-
trine in 1957.58
III. The Felony Murder Doctrine in New York From Colonial
Times to 1967
During the colonial era, the province of New York applied the
common law of crimes and supplemental statutory law.59 No statute
or reported decision during this period dealt with the felony murder
doctrine. Following the American Revolution, that part of the com-
mon law that formed the law of the colony of New York on April
19, 1775, continued to be the law of the State of New York, "subject
to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the
same."60 The first homicide statute provided, inter alia, that "all
wilful killing by poisoning of any person . . . shall be . . . deemed
wilful murder of malice prepense. '" 6' This statute, however, did not
constitute a comprehensive treatment of homicide. As a result, the
common law of homicide, whatever it may have been, continued to
apply.
At the start of the nineteenth century, critics characterized the
common law of crimes as being filled with fictions, contradictions
and incongruities.62 The mounting criticism generated a movement
to codify the law. 63
A. The 1829 Revised Statutes
The legislature responded by enacting the Revised Statutes of 1829,
which contained the first comprehensive codification of the criminal
law in New York.64 The Revised Statutes provided that "[tihe killing
and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to
say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to
cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused
death, should be murder.
Id. at 313.
58. See generally Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise
the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. RPv. 624 (1957).
59. See, e.g., 1 COLONiAL LAWS OF NEw YORK 20 (1894).
60. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also Waters v. Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302, 309,
82 N.E. 143, 145 (1907) (principles and rules of common law continue in force
unless abrogated or modified by express constitutional or statutory enactment).
61. 1787 N.Y. Laws 336.
62. See Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 660.
63. See 1825 N.Y. Laws 446.
64. Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 525. The New York State Law Revision
Commission concluded:
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of a human being, without the authority of law .... is either murder,,
manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, according to the
facts and circumstances of each case." ' 65 In the notes to the section
that defined murder, the 1829 revisers wrote: "There is no departure
from the present law, except in the case of implied malice, arising
from being engaged in an unlawful act." 66 This comment referred
to the fiction of the "implied malice doctrine," which the revisers
believed had previously applied to an unintended killing in the course
of committing any "unlawful act." '67
In any event, the revisers dealt with an "unlawful act" homicide
as follows: (1) a homicide in the course of a felony was murder; 6
What general basic views with regard to criminal law were entertained
by the revisers in 1829 . . . we can only surmise. Possibly they held no
reasoned convictions with regard to the underlying purposes and principles
of a proper penal code. An examination of their notes reveals no decisive
statement of their views ....
Id. at 529.
65. N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1829, part IV, ch. I, tit. I, § 4. Section 5 defined
the degreeless crime of murder as follows:
Such killing, unless it be manslaughter or excusable or justifiable homicide
... shall be murder in the following cases: 1. When perpetrated from
a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any
human being: 2. When perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to
others, and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although
without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular
individual: 3. When perpetrated without any design to effect death, by
a person engaged in the commission of any felony.
Id. § 5. Manslaughter in the first degree was defined as follows:
The killing of a human being, without a design to effect death, by the
act, procurement or culpable negligence of any other, while such other
is engaged, 1. In the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not
amounting to felony: or, 2. In an attempt to perpetrate any such crime
or misdemeanor, In [sic] cases where such killing would be murder at
the common law ...
Id. tit. II, art. 1, § 6. Manslaughter in the third degree was defined as follows:
The involuntary killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or
culpable negligence of another, while such other person is engaged in
the commission of a trespass or other injury to private rights or property,
or engaged in an attempt to commit such injury. ...
Id. tit. II, art. I, § 13.
66. See Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 545 n.60 (quoting notes to homicide
provisions of Revised Statutes, ch. I, tit. I, § 5, as reported to state senate, Nov.
2, 1827).
67. Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 545. This, of course, was Coke's view
which may never have actually been the law. See id. at 540. The objective view
obviously simplifies the prosecutor's problems of proof-the prosecutor need not
prove the defendant's state of mind at the time he acted. Every offense, in other
words, would be one of strict or absolute culpability.
68. Id. at 533.
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(2) a homicide in the course of a misdemeanor was manslaughter
in the first degree; 69 and (3) a homicide in the course of a private
wrong was manslaughter in the third degree.70
Thus, the revisers significantly changed the law in three ways.
First, the definition of murder was different from the common law
definition-"a killing with malice aforethought."'" Since the statute
articulated a self-contained substantive rule of law that a killing
"shall be murder . . . [w]hen perpetrated . . . by a person engaged
in the commission of any felony,"" a New York court no longer
had to rely upon the fictions73 of implied "malice aforethought"
or "constructive murder" or "transferred intent." 74
Second, the 1829 felony murder statute was cast in terms of "a
person engaged in the commission of any felony." 75 Thus, unlike
the manslaughter statutes, the felony murder statute contained no
69. Id. at 534-35.
70. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
71. See N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1829, part IV, ch. I, tit. I, § 5(3).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 427, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1160,
426 N.Y.S.2d 253, 258 (1980) ("in felony murder the underlying felony is not so
much an element of the crime but instead functions as a replacement for the mens
rea or intent necessary for common law murder"); see also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
JR., CRIMINAL LAW 545 n.2 (1972) ("[tlhis sort of talk is pure fiction, and it is
better to recognize felony murder as a category of murder separate from intent-to-
kill murder") [hereinafter LAFAVE & SCOTT].
74. See 1787 N.Y. Laws 336-38. The words "malice aforethought" do not
appear in the 1829 statute, and indeed, were never used in any New York penal
statute. See N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1829, part IV, ch. I, tit. I, § 5(3). Between
1787 and 1829, the New York statutory law referred to "murder of malice prepense."
See id. Indeed, in defining malice aforethought murder, the revisers used the term
"premeditated design." Id. Nevertheless, from the time of the enactment of the
revised statutes to less than 20 years ago, prosecutors in New York continued to
charge the defendant with a "malice aforethought killing," and courts would discuss
in detail the concept of express malice aforethought and the fictions of transferred
intent and implied malice aforethought. This peculiar and profoundly confusing
development arose from the following statement made by the New York Court for
the Correction of Errors a few years after the Revised Statutes took effect:
Where an offense is created by statute, which was not an offense by
the common law, it is a general rule that the indictment must charge
the offense to have been committed under the circumstances and with
the intent mentioned in the statute, which of course contains the only
appropriate definition of the crime .... It is otherwise in indictments
for common law offenses .... Thus, in an indictment for murder, the
terms murder of his malice aforethought are considered absolutely nec-
essary in describing the offense; and if these words are left out of the
indictment, it will be deemed a case of manslaughter only.
People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 172-73 (N.Y. 1834).
75. N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1829, part IV, ch. I, tit. I, § 5(3).
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express reference to an attempt to commit a felony. 76 Any such
reference, however, was unnecessary, because under the revised
statutes, an attempt to commit a felony was itself the commission
of that particular felony. 77
Third, the statute defined manslaughter in the first degree as a
killing by a person "engaged ... [i]n the perpetration of any crime
or misdemeanor not amounting to a felony ... [i]n cases where
such killing would be murder at the common law. "78 This latter
clause-"[i]n cases where such killing would be murder at the com-
mon law"-was predicated solely upon the reviser's understanding
that, at common law, an actor was guilty of murder if he committed
a homicide while committing any one of the following four unlawful
acts: (1) a substantive felony; (2) an attempt to commit a substantive
felony (at common law an attempt to commit any felony was a
misdemeanor); (3) any substantive crime or misdemeanor not amount-
ing to a felony; and (4) an attempt to commit any crime or mis-
demeanor not amounting to a felony. 79 Of these four unlawful acts,
the first constituted murder under the 1829 Act." The other three
constituted manslaughter in the first degree.81 Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to infer that the revisers intended to exclude attempts to
commit a felony that constituted a misdemeanor from the scope of
felony murder.
New York's first felony murder statute raised some questions. For
example, if, in the future, the legislature created a new felony,
might the new offense be the predicate for a felony murder con-
viction? Or, if, in the future, the legislature reclassified as a mis-
demeanor what had previously been a felony, might that reclassified
offense thereafter serve as the predicate for a felony murder con-
76. See id.
77. See id. tit. VII, §§ 3, 12, 13, 30. The one exception relates to an attempt
to commit a felony punishable "for any term less than four years." Id. § 3(3).
Such an attempt was a misdemeanor. See id. A review of the revised statutes
does not reveal any felony that has ever served as the basis for a felony murder
prosecution for which the penalty was less than four years. Thus, in essence, under
the revised statutes, an attempt to commit a felony was itself a felony for purposes
of the felony murder doctrine.
78. Id. tit. II, art. I, § 6.
79. See id.
80. See id. tit. I, § 5(3).
81. See id. tit. II, art. I, § 6. The revisers also understood that at common law,
an actor was guilty of manslaughter if he committed: (1) a trespass or other injury
to private rights or property; or (2) an attempt to commit an injury. Id. § 13. Under
the 1829 statutory scheme, these two unlawful acts fall within the definition of
manslaughter in the third degree. See id.
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viction? In 1834, Chancellor Walworth answered the former question
in the affirmative and the latter in the negative."
One clear and reasonable inference may be drawn from the 1829
statutory language: 'to be guilty of felony murder, the actor had
to be engaged in felonious conduct'either conduct constituting a
substantive felony or attempt conduct itself constituting a felony-
at the time of the homicide. If the attempt to commit a felony
constituted only a misdemeanor then the felony murder doctrine was
inapplicable. Hence, the focus of the statute was on the nature and
quality of the crime that the defendant had committed at the time
of the homicide.83 In the view of one authority, the intent of the
revised statutes was to preclude prosecution for illegal acts that did
not constitute felonies .14 Indeed, the highest appeals court at that
time, concluded that the 1829 legislature had intended that certain
lesser offenses were excluded from the scope of the felony murder
doctrine.85
82. Enoch, 13 Wend: at 175. The court stated:
[A]s often as the legislature creates new felonies, or raises offenses Which
were only misdemeanors at the common law, to the grade of felony, a
new class of murders is created .... So, on the other hand, when the
legislature abolishes an offense which, at the common law, was a felony,
or reduces it to the grade of a misdemeanor only, the case of an unlawful
killing, by a person engaged in the act which was before a felony, will
no longer be considered to be murder, but manslaughter merely. Such
changes in the law of murder have often occurred .... [Tihe killing is
adjudged to be murder or manslaughter, according to the nature and




84. Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 734. The manslaughter provisions of
the 1829 Revised Statutes:
[R]epresented an attempt by the revisers to reduce the grade of culpability
of certain homicides below the rank they were thought to have occupied
at common law. Sufficient authoritative force may have remained in
Coke's dictum to have compelled a feeling that express statutory provision
should be made to prevent the application of the doctrine in its full
scope; while continuing the rule that "unlawful act" homicides were
murder when the unlawful acts causing death were felonies, it is not too
farfetched to suppose that the intention was to make certain that liability
for murder would not be imposed for death-causing "unlawful acts"
which were not felonies.
Id. at 734-35.
85. Enoch, 13 Wend. at 173-74. The legislature, according to the court,
Unquestionably succeeded in restricting some cases to the grade of man-
slaughter, which, upon the principles of the common law, never ought
to have been considered or adjudged to be offenses of a higher grade;
such as the unintentional killing of a person, by an offender who was
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Thus, New York's first felony murder statute excluded from its
scope an actor who at the time of the homicide was engaged in
overt conduct that in law was classified as a misdemeanor. Except
for the unintended aberration in the 1967 revision with respect to
the misdemeanor of attempted escape in the second degree, 6 this has
been the felony murder rule in New York continuously from 1829
to the present.
B. The 1860 Felony Murder Statute
The homicide provisions of the 1829 Revised Statutes essentially
remained unchanged until 1860, when the legislature adopted a
radically different definition of murder. 7 Although the statute pro-
vided that first degree murder was punishable by death" and second
degree murder by life imprisonment,89 the legislature failed to define
the term "murder" in the statute. Although second degree murder
included "all other kinds of murder," 9 its scope and meaning was
less than clear.
The felony murder definition also contained ambiguities. Defining
felony murder as a "murder" committed in the perpetration of an
enumerated felony, 9' the legislature did not definitively indicate whether
unintended killings were within its scope.
Nevertheless, the 1860 first degree felony murder statute did enu-
merate the predicate offenses. 92 With respect to the crimes of arson,
rape, robbery and burglary, the statute made express reference to
an attempt to perpetrate one of these crimes. 93 In fact this statute
engaged in a riot or other offense, that was a mere misdemeanor, and
not a felony.
Id. at 174.
86. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
87. 1860 N.Y. Laws ch. 410, at 712. Section 2 of the statute read:
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison or by lying
in wait, or by any other kind of wilful deliberate and premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration or the attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary, or in any attempt to
escape from imprisonment, shall be deemed murder of the first degree,
and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second
degree ....
Id. § 2, at 712-13.
88. See id. § 1, at 712.
89. See id. § 6, at 713.
90. See id. § 2, at 712-13.
91. See id.
92. See id. ("perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery




was the first New York felony murder statute that expressly included
an attempt. 94
Although two sections of the revised statutes expressly dealt with
an attempt to escape from imprisonment, 95-one dealing with a
felony96 and the other with a misdemeanor 97-the 1860 felony murder
statute refered to "any attempt to escape from imprisonment." 98
Although a literal reading of this phrase may suggest that it embraced
both sections, it is simply inconceivable that the 1860 leglislature
intended that a misdemeanor be a predicate for a felony murder
conviction because up until 1860, "any felony" could serve as the
foundation for a murder prosecution, and the 1860 statute narrowed
94. Id. The reason for this explicit reference is obvious-the predicate felonies
were expressly listed in the 1860 statute. The first felony murder statute enacted
in 1829, as well as a subsequent one, referred to the commission of "any felony."
See 1873 N.Y. Laws ch. 644, § 5, at 1014-15. Since an attempt to commit any
felony was itself a felony, there was no need to refer expressly to an attempt when
the predicate was statutorily declared to be "any felony."
Each of the four crimes of arson, rape, robbery and burglary under the revised
statutes was a felony in every degree. See N.Y. Revised Statutes of 1829, part IV,
ch. I, tit. III, art. 1, § 9 (prescribing four degrees of arson-each a felony). There
were two degrees of rape, and both were felonies. Id. tit. II, art. 2, §§ 22, 23. There
were two degrees of robbery, and both were felonies. Id. tit. III, art. 5, § 57. There
were three degrees of burglary, and each was a felony. Id. art. 2, § 21. An attempt
to commit arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, in any degree, was in and of itself
a felony. Id. tit. VII, art. 1, § 3. The enumerated crime of any attempt to escape
from imprisonment presents an interesting question. See id. tit. IV, art. 3, § 23.
Entitled "Of Escapes from Prisons, and assisting therein," article 3 contained 12
sections, numbered 13-24. Section 23 dealt with the completed crime of escaping
from state prison. Id. § 23. Section 24 dealt with the completed crime of escaping
from a county jail. Id. § 24.
Section 23 read as follows:
Every person, lawfully imprisoned in a state prison for any term less
than life, who shall attempt, by force or violence to any person, to
escape from such prison, whether such escape be effected or not; shall,
upon conviction, be adjudged to imprisonment in a state prison for a
term not exceeding five years, to commence after the termination of the
imprisonment to which such person shall have been sentenced, at the
time of such attempt.
Id. § 23.
Section 24 stated:
Every person lawfully imprisoned in a county jail, for any cause whatever,
who shall forcibly break the prison, with intent to escape therefrom, or
who shall attempt, by any force or violence, to escape from such prison,
although no escape be effected, shall, upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding, one year.
Id. § 24.
95. See id. §§ 23, 24.
96. See id. § 23 (attempt to escape state prison).
97. See id. § 24 (attempt to escape from county jail).
98. See 1860 N.Y. Laws ch. 410, at 713.
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the scope of the felony murder doctrine to certain felonies: arson,
rape, robbery and burglary. 99 As a result, it is not reasonable to
infer that the legislature intended to include the misdemeanor of
attempted escape.'0 The only reasonable conclusion is that a drafting
error occurred-one remarkably similar to the error made a century
later. io1
C. Revision of 1860 Felony Murder Statute
The 1860 felony murder statute was shortlived. In enacting a
radically different murder provision, the legislature made at least
two major drafting blunders: (1) the new murder statute was intended
to be applicable retroactively; and (2) it repealed the 1829 murder
statute without a savings clause.l q2
In an effort to correct quickly the threatened chaos to the criminal
justice system, the 1861 session of the legislature enacted a bill 1°3
declaring the 1829 murder statute "revived" and "made operative"
with respect to offenses committed prior to the enactment of the
1860 statute. It further prescribed that a defendant convicted of
murder under the "revived" statute had the unqualified right to
choose a sentence of death or life imprisonment.10°
In 1862, the legislature, undoubtedly cognizant of the near-fatal
drafting errors made two years earlier, repealed the 1860 murder
statute and enacted a new scheme that, among other things, further
modified the felony murder doctrine. 05 The 1862 statute provided
specifically enumerated circumstances in which a killing constituted
first degree murder. If not first degree murder, a killing could be
manslaughter or a justifiable homicide. 1°6
99. See id.
100. See infra note 153.
101. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
102. In People v. Hartung, 22 N.Y. 95, 102-103 (1860), the court, citing basic
ex post facto principles, held that the new law could not apply to crimes committed
prior to its effective date; and, citing a common law principle that there ceases
to be any criminal liability if a penal statute is repealed without a savings clause,
declared void all proceedings based on the former statute.
103. 1861 N.Y. Laws ch. 303, at 693.
104. Id. at 694.
105. 1862 N.Y. Laws ch. 197, at 368. However, the 1862 legislation also contained
serious drafting errors with respect to the felony murder doctrine. For example,
if read literally, the statute abolished the felony murder doctrine with the exception
of the one underlying felony of first degree arson. Id. at 369.
106. Id. The statute provided:
[A killing] shall be murder in the first degree, in the following cases:
First. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death
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This 1862 statute eliminated felony murder as a category of first
degree murder. The only exception was a homicide resulting from
the commission of arson in the first degree. 0 7 The 1862 murder law
of the person killed, or of any human being; Second. When perpetrated
by any act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved
mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design
to effect the death of any particular individual; Third. When perpetrated
in committing the crime of arson in. the first degree. Such killing, unless
it be murder in the first degree, or manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable
homicide, as hereinafter provided, or when perpetrated without any design
to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony,
shall be murder in the second degree.
Id. at 369. Murder in the first degree was punishable by death; murder in the
second degree was punishable "by imprisonment in a state prison for any term
not less than ten years." Id.
107. See, e.g., Lanergan v. People, 34 How. Pr. 390 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. New York
County 1867), rev'd on other grounds, 39 N.Y. 39 (1868). The court stated:
The definition of murder in the second degree is exceedingly obscure,
under the act of 1862. A slight verbal alteration will make it definite
and certain, and not unreasonable, or perhaps it is better to say, not
without reason. As it reads literally, there is no affirmative definition
of murder in the second degree .... A further reference to the statutes
is in vain to find what is committed by the killing of a human being,
"when perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the commission of any felony." As the statutes now read, such killing
is not murder in the first degree, and it is excepted from the definition
of murder in the second degree, nor is it found in any other portion
of the statutes punishable as a crime. Clearly, it could not have been
the intention of the legislature to exempt such a class of crime from
any punishment ... [I] suggest that an obliteration of the last "or"
occurring in the sentence ...defining murder in the second degree, will
remove obscurity now existing.
Id. at 401; Fitzgerrold v. People, 37 N.Y. 413 (1868). In the same year, the
Fitzgerrold court added:
By this [1862] amendment, a killing, when perpetrated in committing the
crime of arson in the first degree, still constituted the offense of murder
in the first degree. When, however, the killing was perpetrated without
any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of
a felony, other than that of arson in the first degree, it was murder in
the second degree only. This was the entire effect of the amendment of
1862. This section is obscure, and has been sometimes read as if the words
"or when perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person
engaged in the commission of any felony," formed an exception, like
the words "or manslaughter" or "justifiable homicide." Upon this con-
struction no crime of murder in the second degree is created. The very
crime intended to be thereby created is by this construction declared
not to be such crime. A more reasonable construction should be put
upon the language, and effect given to the evident intention of the
legislature. The statute may be thus paraphrased: ". . . Such killing,
unless it be murder, or manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide,
as hereinafter provided, shall be murder in the second degree, when
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remained unchanged until 1873, when the legislature adopted a new
definition of first degree and second degree murder. 0 8 The new law
classified all felony murders-not merely first degree arson-as first
degree murder. 109 The legislature, abandoning the salutary approach
of listing the predicate felonies, adopted verbatim the definition of
felony murder that was contained in the Revised Statutes of 1829.1"
perpetrated without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the
commission of any felony." This was the evident intent of the framers
of the statute, and in my judgment is a justifiable construction of the
language.
Id. at 419 (citations omitted); Homicide Study, supra note 40, at 559-60. The 1937
New York Law Revision Commission Report summarized the situation:
The unclear second degree murder provision ... placed the courts in a
dilemma. They were faced with the necessity of declaring that the provision
was a residuary definition negatively phrased or that felony murder was
the sole kind of homicide comprehended within the definition of murder
in the second degree. Acceptance of the first solution would have meant
a finding that the doctrine of felony murder had been abolished and
that henceforth all homicides committed in the course of felonies other
than arson in the first degree could not be punished as murder. The
second horn of the dilemma would force the courts to do obvious violence
to the words of the statute and frustrate the apparent intention of the
Legislature to mitigate the rigor of the rules relating to intentional murder
... [Tihe Court of Appeals concluded all doubt by definitely choosing
the second course.
Id.
108. 1873 N.Y. Laws ch. 644, at 1014-15.
109. Id. at 1015.
110. See id. at 1014-15. The 1873 statute (which also, incidentally contained a
carefully crafted savings clause) provided that a killing, unless it be manslaughter
or excusable or justifiable homicide:
[S]hall be murder in the first degree, in the following cases: First, when
perpetrated from a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the death
of the person killed, or of any human being. Second, when perpetrated
by an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to
effect the death of any particular individual. Third, when perpetrated
without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission
of any felony. Such killing, unless it be murder in the first degree, or
manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide, as hereinafter pro-
vided, shall be murder in the second degree when perpetrated intentionally
but without deliberation and premeditation.
Id. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the revised
statutes of 1829.
In Dolan v. People, 6 Hun. 493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 64
N.Y. 485 (1876), a case involving a felony murder prosecution, the meaning of
the statutory phrase when perpetrated "without any design to effect death" was ques-
tioned. Id. at 497-98; see also Buel v. People, 78 N.Y. 492, 499 (1879) (striking
out words "without any design to effect death" in order to avoid necessity of show-
ing there was such intention).
In 1876, in response to the question raised in Dolan, the legislature eliminated
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D. New York's First Penal Code
In 1865, the Commissioners of the Code (known as the Field
Commissioners) submitted to the legislature a proposed penal code,"'
which in 1881 became New York's first Penal Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure."' 2 Its definition of felony murder expressly re-
ferred to "a person engaged in the commission of or in an attempt
to commit a felony.""' 3 The Field Commissioners proposed this
"attempt" language, intending solely to parallel the long existing
attempt language in the manslaughter sections of the revised stat-
utes. 114
the quoted phrase from the statutory definition of felony murder. 1876 N.Y. Laws
ch. 333, at 317. However, five years later, the quoted phrase reappeared in the
new Penal Code's definition of felony murder. 1881 N.Y. Law ch. 676, at 1. It
may be that the legislature focused on a draft of a proposed Penal Code prepared
11 years before the Dolan decision, and that the legislature simply overlooked the
change it made in 1876.
111. See generally Proposed 1865 N.Y. Penal Law.
112. See 1881 N.Y. Laws ch. 676, at 1. Section 183 of the Penal Code of 1881
reads as follows:
The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is
murder in the first degree, when committed either 1. From a deliberate
and premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or of
another; or 2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a design
to effect the death of any individual; or 3. Without design to effect
death, by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to
commit a felony, either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise;
or 4. When perpetrated in committing the crime of arson in the first
degree.
Id. Subdivision four, relating to felony murder when the predicate is arson in the
first degree, was the product of another legislative error. As noted earlier, between
1862 and 1873 felony murder, as a capital offense, was limited to first degree
arson; all other felonies formed the predicate for second degree felony murder.
The person who drafted the murder provision of the 1881 Penal Code was simply
confused. Subdivision three stated the broad felony murder doctrine. Subdivision
four was patently redundant. Id. § 183.
In People v. Greenwall, 115 N.Y. 520, 22 N.E. 180 (1889), the court wrote:
Why subdivision 4 was added cannot certainly be perceived. Its gram-
matical structure is such as to lead us to suppose that it was added by
some one after the prior portions of the section had been drafted and
completed by another. The draftsman of subdivision 4 clearly did not
have a clear comprehension of the force and effect of the prior subdivision.
Id. at 524-25, 22 N.E. at 181.
113. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 183 (1881).
114. See id. § 85. The Field Commissioners' commentary is as follows: "If the
accused was committing a felony when he perpetrated the homicide, it is murder,
though unintentional. If he was committing a misdemeanor, the homicide is man-
slaughter in the first degree. The sections embodying these two ideas should cor-
respond in language." Id. (emphasis in original).
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The legislature generally did not label specific crimes as felonies
or misdemeanors in the Penal Code of 1881. Rather, the punishment
determined the classification. In some sections that defined crimes,
however, the legislature neither described the conduct as a felony
or a misdemeanor nor prescribed any punishment. A catchall statute
filled this gap. 115
An attempt to escape, by a person in confinement or custody on
a charge or conviction for a felony, formed the basis for a felony
murder prosecution under both the Penal Code of 1881 and the Penal
Law of 1909.' 1 6 Hence, the felony murder doctrine, as expressed in
the statutory law of New York between 1829 and 1967 always required
that the defendant be engaged in, or be criminally responsible for,
a felony at the time of the homicidal conduct." 7
115. See N.Y. PENAL CODE (1881). The Penal Code of 1881 prescribed, in essence,
that an attempt to commit a felony was itself a felony. Id. §§ 5, 14. The Code
dealt with the crime of escape in sections 84-93. Section 85, for example, provided
that if a person was in prison or custody and escaped from such prison or custody,
he was guilty of a felony, if such confinement or custody was upon a charge,
conviction or commitment for a felony. And, of course, an attempt to escape from
such confinement or custody constituted a felony. The Penal Law of 1909 produced
no revision of the attempt, escape and homicide statutes, so that these provisions
in the 1881 Penal Code were simply reenacted without substantial change and
continued in effect until 1967 when the revised Penal Law became operative.
116. See People v. Johnson, 110 N.Y. 134, 141, 17 N.E. 684, 686 (1888)
(defendant's attempted escape while killing took place held felony); see also People
v. Huter, 184 N.Y. 237, 240, 77 N.E. 6, 7 (1906); People v. Flanigan, 174 N.Y.
356, 366, 66 N.E. 988, 991 (1903); People v. Wilson, 145 N.Y. 628, 633, 40 N.E.
392, 393 (1895); People v. Oddy, 16 A.D.2d 585, 586, 229 N.Y.S.2d 983, 985 (4th
Dep't 1962).
117. See People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 411, 427, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1160, 426
N.Y.S.2d 253, 258 (1980) (in felony murder, underlying felony is not so much
element of crime but instead functions as replacement for intent necessary for
common law murder); People v. Murray, 40 N.Y.2d 327, 340, 353 N.E.2d 605,
614, 386 N.Y.S.2d 691, 700 (1976) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (vital item in felony
murder is predicate felony), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977); People v. LaMarca,
3 N.Y.2d 452, 465, 144 N.E.2d 420, 428, 165 N.Y.S.2d 753, 764, amended,
3 N.Y.2d 933, 145 N.E.2d 892, 167 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1957) (necessary qualification
engrafted on felony murder rule that underlying felony must be independent of
homicide), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1958); People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390,
396, 397, 55 N.E.2d 469, 474 (1944) (felony murder statutes prior to 1967 require
independent felony); People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, !78, 181 N.E. 88, 91 (1932)
(defendant must be guilty of independent felony during which homicide occurred);
People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 310, 314-15, 178 N.E. 290, 292 (1931) (defendant
must be engaged in commission of another felony); id. at 317, 178 N.E. at 293
(Crane, J., concurring) ("important proof in a felony murder is the felony, because
this makes the act of killing murder in the first degree, even though the defendant
did not intend to kill .... The felony . . . must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . . "); People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 226, 129 N.E. 883, 884 (1921)
(evidence of engagement in commission of another felony proves malice and felonious
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From the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1829118 to the
enactment of the Revised Penal Law of 1967,119 New York's statutory
law of homicide always recognized the misdemeanor manslaughter
rule. 20 Thus, if a defendant was charged with felony murder and
the proof suggested that the defendant may have been engaged in
a misdemeanor rather than a felony at the time of the killing, the
trial court had to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of
manslaughter. 12'
intent necessary for conviction of murder); People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 611,
107 N.E. 1058, 1061 (1915) (to justify conviction of murder in first degree for
unintentional homicide on ground that it was committed while defendant was actually
engaged in commission of felony, every essential element of latter crime must be
established); People v. Huter, 184 N.Y. 237, 244, 77 N.E. 6, 8 (1906) (felony
separate and independent from homicide required to support felony murder con-
viction); People v. Foster, 50 N.Y. 598, 602 (1872) (felony murder exists only when
killer was engaged at time in commission of felony).
In 1960, the court of appeals succinctly traced the development of this view:
[F]elony murder doctrine had its origin in the common law during an era
when nearly all felonies were punishable by death. Because this often
resulted in a barbaric application, the doctrine passed through a series
of judicial and later legislative restrictions and limitations. However, both
at common law and under the New York statute, a felonious homicide
is made murder in the first degree by operation of the legal fiction of
transferred intent, which thereby characterizes the homicide as committed
with malice prepense. It is the malice of the underlying felony that is at-
tributed to the felon.
People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331
(1960) (citations omitted).
118. See 1829 N.Y. Laws part IV, ch. 1, tit. I.
119. See 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 791, at 1309.
120. In People v. Stacy, 119 A.D. 743, 104 N.Y.S. 615 (3rd Dep't 1907), aff'd
without opinion, 192 N.Y. 577, 85 N.E. 1114 (1908), the court affirmed a man-
slaughter conviction under the misdemeanor manslaughter rule although it expressed
doubt as to whether the defendant's predicate conduct was a misdemeanor or a
felony. Id. at 748, 104 N.Y.S. at 619. However, there appears to be no reported
case in New York or any, other jurisdiction that affirmed a felony murder conviction
while expressing doubt as to whether the underlying crime was a felony or a
misdemeanor.
121. In People v. Koerber, 244 N.Y. 147, 155 N.E. 79 (1926), the court wrote:
Generally speaking murder . . .connotes the specific or particular intent
to kill, while manslaughter ... is felonious homicide when the intent
to kill is absent. But when one engaged in the commission of a felony,
his mind being fatally bent on mischief but without a design to effect
death, kills a human being, at common law, the killing is said to be
with malice aforethought and so murder, and the Penal Law attaches
to the act the consequences of murder in the first degree. The People
on an indictment for felony murder may fail to establish that defendant
was engaged in the commission of a felony, but may offer evidence
tending to show that the homicide was committed by him when engaged
in a misdemeanor, which would reduce the offense to manslaughter in
the first degree or in the commission of a trespass or other invasion of
a private right, which would reduce it to manslaughter in the second
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IV. Law Revision Commission: 1961-1967
In 1961, the New York Legislature created a Temporary Com-
mission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, which,
among other things, revised the felony murder statute.' Shortly after
its organization, the Commission issued its first interim report,
observing: "Other major phases of Penal Law legislation which
suggest a need for thorough analysis and re-examination include our
laws of homicide with their various degrees of murder and man-
slaughter, considered by some to be outmoded in certain important
respects . *. . ."12 In its second interim report, the Commission stated
its intent to propose a rewritten homicide statute,' 24 and remarked
that "the whole theme of the proposed [homicide] article . . . [is]
substantially taken from the recent Model Penal Code of the Amer-
ican Law Institute .... ,,125 Defining "felony" in a way essentially
degree. Where the facts would justify a verdict based on such a theory,
the degrees of manslaughter should be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 152-53, 155 N.E. at 82 (citations omitted).
122. See 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 346, at 518. The legislature directed the agency:
[Situdy ... existing provisions of the penal law and ... prepare, for
submission to the legislature, a revised, simplified body of substantive
laws relating to crimes .... More specifically the commission shall make
such changes and revisions as will: a. restate, enumerate and accurately
define substantive provisions of law relating to crimes and offenses by
adding or amending language where necessary so as to improve substantive
content and remove ambiguity and duplication; b. eliminate existing
substantive provisions of law which are no longer useful or necessary;
Id.
123. N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 41, 185th Sess. 15 (1962).
124. See N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 8, 186th Sess. 38-39 (1963). The Commission wrote:
[T]he basic . . . articles are being . . . re-written .... Among these are
completely revised articles and sections dealing with homicide ... [A]
new homicide article-virtually completed except for two or three as yet
unsettled controversial points ... presents an entirely new structure
.... Since this proposal .. . is soon to be circulated for study with a
detailed explanatory memorandum, a complete description of the article
... will not be attempted here.
One of its features is a single, degreeless murder statute, replacing the
existing two-degree pattern. Containing three subdivisions, this section
defines the three traditional, basic forms of murder: (1) intentional killing,
(2) the wanton or depraved type, and (3) felony murder.
Id.
125. Id. The Model Penal Code was approved by the American Law Institute
on May 24, 1962. The Code provides:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when ... it is committed recklessly
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of
human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor
is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
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similar to that of New York, 26 the Model Penal Code contains a
felony murder provision that specifically enumerates seven crimes.1 27
The first six are classified as felonies: robbery; forcible rape; forcible
deviate sexual intercourse; arson; burglary; and kidnapping.' 28 An at-
tempt to commit any one of these crimes is also a felony.' 2 9 The
seventh crime is "felonious escape."' 30 This provision, however, ex-
cludes escape conduct that merely constitutes a misdemeanor.' 3 '
In October, 1963, New York's Penal Law Revision Commission
received a tentative draft revision of the Penal Law.3 2 The proposed
felony murder provision read as follows:
A person is guilty of murder when: . . . . 3. Either alone or in
concert with others, he commits or attempts to commit a felonious
crime of robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, escape or a forcible,
.felonious sex crime, and, in the course of and in furtherance of
such crime or of the immediate flight of the perpetrators thereof
or any one of them, one or more commits an act inherently
dangerous to human life which causes the death of a person other
than one of the perpetrators.'
The use of the terms "felonious crime" and "felonious sex crime"
belied an intention to change the traditional requirement for a felony
murder conviction-that is that the predicate conduct (completed or
attempted) constitute a felony not a misdemeanor. 3 4 In addition,
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson,
burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962).
126. See id. § 1.04(2) (authorizes sentence of imprisonment in excess of one
year).
127. See id. § 210.2.
128. See id. § 222.1 (robbery); id. § 213.1 (forcible rape); id. § 213.2 (forcible
deviate sexual intercourse); id. § 220.1 (arson); id. § 221.1 (burglary); id. § 212.1
(kidnapping).
129. See id. § 5.05(1) (attempt is crime "of the same grade and degree as the
most serious offense that is attempted").
130. Id. § 242.6. Section 242.6 defines in detail the crime of escape. See id.
Escape is classified as a felony except that certain escape conduct constitutes a
misdemeanor-for example, a person under arrest for a misdemeanor who escapes
without employing force or a dangerous weapon. Thus, the Model Penal Code's
felony murder section uses the term "felonious escape" to exclude escape conduct
constituting a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 210.2(b), 242.6(4). A person who attempts to
commit the crime of felonious escape is, of course, guilty of a felony. Id.
131. See id.
132. See generally Tentative Draft Revision of the Penal Law, State of New
York Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code
(1963) [hereinafter 1963 Tentative Draft Revision].
133. Proposed N.Y. Penal Law (Sen. Int. 3918, Ass. Int. 1964) § 130.25(3)
[hereinafter Proposed N.Y. Penal Law].
134. See id. For a further discussion of the Commission's and the legislature's
intent, see infra notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
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the enumerated crimes in this draft were identical to those listed in
the felony murder provision of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code.'35
Unfortunately, the October 1963 draft contained a subtle and
unintended error. Although escape constituted a felony under the
felony murder statute, the draft's crime of escape consisted of three
degrees. 36 Escape in the first and second degrees were class D and
class E felonies.'37 Escape in the third degree, however, was a class
A misdemeanor. 38
The section on punishment for attempt, however, provided-as it
does today-that an attempt to commit a felony itself constitutes
a felony-with the narrow exception that an attempt to commit a
class E felony is a class A misdemeanor. 1 Thus, unintentionally,
the draft included the class A misdemeanor of an attempt to commit
the class E felony of escape in the second degree in the murder
provision. The draft similarly included the class A misdemeanor of
an attempt to commit the class E felony of arson in the third degree
(which, as discussed earlier, is a non-existent crime and therefore
unimportant). 140
In May 1963, the Commission reviewed the proposed draft 4' and,
unaware that a misdemeanor crime was secreted within the proposed
felony murder statute, approved numerous changes. 42 After further
changes and revised drafts 43 the Commission approved the felony
135. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962) with Proposed N.Y. Penal
Law, supra note 133, § 130.25(3).
136. See Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, §§ 210.05 to -.15.
137. See id. §§ 210.10, 210.15.
.138. See id. § 210.05.
139. See id. § 110.05.
140. See id. § 155.05. This section provided that arson in the third degree was a
class E felony and, pursuant to § 110.05(5), an attempt to commit a class E felony
constituted a class A misdemeanor.
141. See generally 1963 Tentative Draft Revision, supra note 132.
142. See generally New York Legislative Document No. 14, Third Interim Report
of the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law
and Criminal Code (1964).
143. See id. The proposed statute read as follows:
A person is guilty of murder when: .... 3. Either alone or in concert
with others, he commits or attempts to commit a felonious crime of
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, escape or a felonious sex crime,
and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of the immediate
flight of the perpetrator thereof or any one of them, one or more
commits an act inherently dangerous to human life which causes the
death of a person other than one of the perpetrators; except that it shall
constitute an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this subdivision
that a defendant, though a participant in the underlying felony: (a) Did
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murder provision with certain changes,'" and on February. 1, 1964,
submitted a proposed revised Penal Law to the legislature as a study
bill.' 45 The legislature eventually enacted a later, but essentially similar
version of this proposed Penal Law.'
46
not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, counsel, encourage,
cause or aid the commission thereof; and (b) Was not armed with any
deadly weapon, or any implement, article or substance capable of inflicting
serious injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried about in public places
by law-abiding persons; and (c) Did not know that any of his confederates
was armed with such a weapon, implement, article or substance; and
(d) Never contemplated committing, under any circumstances, an act
inherently dangerous to human life; and (e) Had no reasonable ground
to believe that any of his confederates intended, under any circumstances,
to commit such an act.
Author's note of the Penal Law revision meetings (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office).
144. See Author's note of the Penal Law revision meetings (available at Fordham
Urban Law Journal office). The Commission offered the following changes: (1) delete
the phrase "under any circumstances" from paragraph (e); (2) delete paragraph (d);
(3) amend the phrase "a felonious sex crime" to read "a forcible, felonious sex
crime." Id. Again, the Commission members and staff were unaware that the felony
murder provision included as a predicate the class A misdemeanors of attempted
escape in the second degree and attempted arson in the third degree. The latter,
in fact, is a non-existent crime, and as a result, its inclusion within the letter of
the statute is meaningless.
145. See Proposed New York Penal Law, Temporary State Commission on
Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code (1964). The felony murder provision
stated:
A person is guilty of murder when: .... 3. Either alone or in concert
with others, he commits or attempts to commit a felonious crime of
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, escape or a forcible, felonious sex
crime, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of the
immediate flight of the perpetrators thereof or any one of them, one
or more commits an act inherently dangerous to human life which causes
the death of a person other than one of the perpetrators; except that it
shall constitute an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this sub-
division that a defendant, though a participant in the underlying felony:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, counsel,
encourage, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (b) Was not armed
with any deadly weapon, or any implement, article or substance capable
of inflicting serious injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried about in
public places by law-abiding persons; and (c) Did not know that any of
his confederates was armed with such a weapon, implement, article or
substance; and (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any of his
confederates intended to commit an act inherently dangerous to human
life.
Id. at 76-77.
146. See generally 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 1030, at 1529. The revised Penal Law
introduced at the 1965 legislative session was enacted into law, effective September
1, 1967. The felony murder provision reads as follows:
A person is guilty of murder when: .... 3. Acting either alone or with
one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery,
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Notwithstanding the long history of the felony murder doctrine
in New York and the Commission's intent that only feloniously
violent conduct should constitute the foundation for a felony murder
conviction, an extremely subtle error remained in the statute.'4 7 It
is clear, however, that the legislature was unaware of this error.' 4 8
Indeed, purposefully including the misdemeanor of an attempt to com-
burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first
degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape in the first degree, or
escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance
of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant,
if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants, except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in
which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime,
it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request,
command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article,
or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury
and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding
persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical
injury.
Id. at 1585-86.
A comparison of this enacted felony murder statute with the counterpart provision
in the 1964 study bill reveals only one substantive change-that is, the deletion,
as recommended by the District Attorneys' Associations, of the phrase "an act
inherently dangerous to human life."
All other changes were stylistic. Thus, the deletion from the 1964 study bill of
the phrase "a participant in the underlying felony" and the substitution in the
1965 statute of the words "participant in the underlying crime" does not show
that the Commission believed that a misdemeanor constituted a foundation for a
felony murder conviction. The change appears to be one of style only and not
substance.
147. See supra notes 152-71 and accompanying text.
148. The felony murder error was not the only flaw that developed at the 1967
session of the legislature. Some brief background to understanding this error is
necessary. Former New York Penal Law § 1044 defined murder in the first degree
in four subdivisions. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (McKinney 1944). Subdivision one
dealt with an intentional killing. Subdivision two dealt with the two distinct fact
situations of depraved indifference murder and felony murder. Subdivisions three
and four were superfluous. See id.
Prior to 1937, the death sentence was the only authorized penalty for murder
in the first degree. After that date, a jury was authorized to recommend life
imprisonment if the conviction was for murder in the first degree as defined in
subdivision two; that is, either depraved indifference murder or felony murder.
1937 N.Y. Laws ch. 67, at 121. The mandatory death sentence continued for convic-
tions under subdivisions one, three and four. Id.
In 1963, the penalty scheme for murder in the first degree was amended to
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mit a felony within the felony murder doctrine would have constituted
a throwback to the common law rule that permitted a felony murder
remove the requirement of a mandatory death sentence for convictions under
subdivisions one, three and four. 1963 N.Y. Laws ch. 994, at 3018. The so-called
two-stage procedure was enacted at the same time. Id. at 3018-19.
In 1965, the penalty scheme was again amended: the death sentence was limited
solely to first degree murder convictions under subdivision one, if the victim was
a peace officer or if the defendant was serving a life sentence. 1965 N.Y. Laws
ch. 321, at 1022. In 1966, the scheme was further amended to include not only
a conviction under subdivision one, but also one situation of the two covered by
subdivision two-that is, felony murder. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 66, at 608-609.
The revised Penal Law, as enacted at the 1965 session, with an effective date
of September 1, 1967, did not physically include the 1965 and 1966 changes relating
to the qualified abolition of the death penalty which were separately enacted at
the two sessions. Nevertheless, the legislature intended that these separately enacted
changes be incorporated into the revised Penal Law. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 321, at
1021-22.
In 1967, the staff of the Penal Law Revision Commission prepared a bill to
incorporate into the revised Penal Law all changes made to the former Penal Law
at the 1965 and 1966 sessions. 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 791, at 2131.
In drafting the provision prescribing the sentence for murder, see id. at 2138,
the staff intended to authorize a jury to return the death penalty for a defendant
convicted of murder as defined in subdivision one, id. (intentional murder), or
subdivision three, id. (felony murder), because these subdivisions were the analogous
provisions of former law authorizing the death penalty. As a result of a drafting
blunder, however, the enacted bill erroneously referred to "subdivision one or
two." Id. If correctly drafted, the bill would have referred to "subdivision one
or three."
The error went undetected by the legislature and the Governor, and by those
solicited to review the proposed legislation. Indeed, it was several months after the
law took effect before this error gained the attention of the Commission's staff.
At the 1968 legislative session, a bill accomplished the necessary correction by
deleting from the appropriate section the word "two" and substituting in its place
the word "three." 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 949, at 1903.
Thus, as a result of an undetected drafting error, for a period of nearly ten
months the Penal Law prescribed the death penalty for a crime (depraved indifference
murder) that the legislature clearly intended not to be a capital offense, and, for
the same period, that law prescribed a maximum penalty of imprisonment for a
crime (felony murder) that the legislature clearly intended to be punishable by
death.
In 1979, the legislature enacted a bill that made "a person thirteen, fourteen,
or fifteen years old . . . criminally responsible for acts constituting" felony murder.
.1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481, at 11; see McQuillan, Felony Murder and the Juvenile
Offender, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 2 (outlining defects in this legislation).
The legislature corrected the deficiencies at its next session. 1979 N.Y. Laws ch.
411, at 1.
These two post-1965 statutory flaws respecting the felony murder doctrine illustrate
that, even when dealing with such subjects as murder and the death penalty, serious
legislative drafting errors do occur. Bill drafters and legislators in other states are
not immune from "nodding" while a deficient statute proceeds to passage. See
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 668 P.2d 697, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1983). The
California Code Commission made a profound error with respect to that state's
felony murder doctrine. The California Supreme Court stated: "It is possible that
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conviction when the predicate conduct consisted of the misdemeanor
of an attempt to commit a felony.'" As previously mentioned, the
Revised Statutes of 1829 expressly rejected that common law rule. 5 '
For a prestigious New York Commission, 130 years later, to resur-
rect knowingly that rule in order to expand the scope of the felony
murder doctrine is simply unthinkable. It would have been patently
regressive for the Commission to extend the felony murder doctrine
beyond what it had always been in New York. Such an extension
incontestably would have evoked considerable discussion and com-
ment by the Commission and others and there was no discussion or
comment by anyone respecting this egregious drafting error.1 '
Moreover, the phrase "though a participant in the underlying
felony" in the proposed statute demonstrates the Commission's pur-
pose and understanding that the felony murder doctrine required
the participant to be involved in the commission of an "underlying
the [California] Legislature intended to reenact the common law felony murder
rule and failed through inadvertence or oversight. But the fact remains that the
legislature did not reenact that rule ... " Id. at 503, 668 P.2d at 737, 194 Cal.
Rptr. at 430 (Broussard., J., concurring and dissenting). The California Supreme
Court in Dillon opined that "[a] thorough legislative reconsideration of the whole
subject would seem to be in order." Id. at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
149. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
151. N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 28, 189th Sess. 9 (1966). In its 1966 report to the
legislature, the Penal Law Revision Commission wrote:
The Commission is by no means of the view that the new Penal Law
represents perfection because it has been enacted into law. The task of
ironing out flaws and eliminating weaknesses which are inevitably dis-
coverable in a project of this magnitude is continuing. Accordingly, the
Commission is preparing for submission to the Legislature (at the 1967
session) an omnibus bill which, if enacted, would amend the new Penal
Law in a number of respects .... The substance of the 1965 [and 19661
amendments to the existing Penal Law must be ... meshed into the
new Penal Law in the form of individual statutes, placed in proper
context and rephrased to conform to the new Penal Law pattern. Some
of the proposed amendments under preparation deal with this problem.
One, for example, would explicitly limit the kinds of murder for which
the death penalty may be imposed in order to conform the new Penal
Law to the 1965 [and 1966] amendment to the existing Penal Law relating
to abolition of capital punishment. Other of the proposed amendments
under preparation ... derive from suggestions advanced by public and
private groups and agencies .... A number of the amendments are




felony."'' 2 A person who engages in conduct that constitutes the
misdemeanor of an attempt to commit the felony of escape in the
second degree is not, of course, guilty of any "underlying felony.' 53
152. See Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, § 130.25, at 77.
153. Id. A person is guilty of the completed felony of escape in the second
degree at the moment when he leaves the detention facility or terminates custody.
If, at that point, "in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of the
immediate flight of the perpetrators thereof [he] . . .causes the death of a person,"
then, under the traditionally understood doctrine, he is guilty of felony murder.
Id.
The Commission's failure to detect the drafting error that inadvertently included
a misdemeanor as a predicate for a felony murder conviction is explainable in part
by comparing the prior law that remained in effect until September 1, 1967, respecting
punishment for an attempt, see N.Y. PENAL. LAW § 261 (1909), with its proposed
revision. Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, § 130.25. Under the Penal
Law of 1909, an attempt to commit any felony was itself a felony-that is, an
attempt to commit a felony was "punishable by imprisonment for not more than
half of the longest term ... prescribed upon a conviction for the commission of
the offense attempted." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 261 (1909).
That law defined a "felony" as "a crime which is or may be punishable by:
1. Death; or 2. Imprisonment in a state prison." Id. § 2. That law further provided
that "[fi]o person shall be sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison if the term
or minimum term for which he is sentenced be less than one year . . . ." Id. § 2182(2).
Thus, with respect to any felony punishable by two years or more, an attempt to
commit such felony would itself be a felony. If the penalty for a completed crime
was exactly two years, an attempt to commit such crime (punishable by exactly one
year) was deemed a felony. Id.
Under the Penal Law of 1909 there seems not to have been any completed felony
punishable by less than two years. See Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133,
App. A: Survey of the New York State Sentencing Structure as of 1963, at A-1
to A-8. Thus, under the 1909 Penal Law, an attempt to commit any felony was
itself a felony. Such was the well established state of the law known to the bench
and bar and the staff and members of the Penal Law Revision Commission.
The Commission was probably not aware that the proposed punishment section
for an attempt would result in attempt crimes, theretofore classified as felonies
and serving as the foundation for a felony murder conviction, being downgraded
to misdemeanors. This reclassification would occur if a less severe sentence was
prescribed for an attempt.,
The Commission seems to have been unaware that the penalties it proposed for
an attempt would be less severe than under the existing Penal Law of 1909. See
Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, § 110.05, at 67. Indeed, in the
commentary to the 1964 study bill section that prescribed the punishment for an
attempt, the Commission stated the exact opposite view: "This section establishes
a penalty scheme rendering an 'attempt to commit a crime' the most serious of
all the inchoate and accessorial offenses .... Dropping the penalty only one notch
below that of the crime attempted, the section penalizes 'attempts' relatively more
severely than does the existing Penal Law [section 261." Id. practice commentary
at 327. This comment is incorrect with respect to an attempt to commit a felony
punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of four years-what we now
know as a class E felony. Under the prior law an attempt to commit such felony
was itself a felony and was punishable by a maximum term of two years. Under
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Indeed, the spirit and purpose of the felony murder statute are
indicated by its title "felony murder." This label has a communicative
the proposed revised Penal Law, which was later approved by the legislature, an
attempt to commit such crime constituted a misdemeanor punishable by a definite
sentence of one year or less. Id. at 67.
The revised Penal Law actually punishes such attempts less severely than did the
former Penal Law of 1909. Id. Indeed, the revised scheme with respect to a class
E felony resembles the common law rule that an attempt to commit a felony was
itself only a misdemeanor. The staff commentary respecting the felony murder
provision, which accompanied the 1964 study bill, conclusively demonstrated the
Commission's understanding that the defendant or an accomplice must in fact be
liable for an "underlying felony" as a condition precedent to criminal responsibility
for felony murder. Id. practice commentary at 339-40. The Commission stated:
Subdivision 3, the felony murder provision, would change the existing
law ... in several respects. Though not in reality a change of substance,
it may first be noted that this provision expressly imposes murder liability
not only upon the killer but upon the non-killer accomplice in the
underlying felony. The existing provision . . . penalizes only the killer;
the liability of the non-killer accomplices has been engrafted upon the
felony murder doctrine by case law ....
Secondly, the crime is broadened to cover killings committed during
"immediate flight" from the underlying felony. The existing law, strictly
limiting felony murder to homicides perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the felony, is, in the Commission's opinion, unduly re-
strictive.
Thirdly, the scope of the crime is narrowed by (1) predicating a selective
list of specified felonies as the only ones which may form a foundation
for felony murder, and (2) requiring that the homicidal act be of a sort
that is "inherently dangerous to human life." The effect of these changes
probably would not be very marked, since felony murders are almost
invariably committed in the course of one or another of the specified
felonies, and almost invariably by an act inherently dangerous to human
life. The purpose of the indicated limitations is to exclude rare instances
of accidental or not reasonably foreseeable fatality, and especially those
which might happen to occur in a most unlikely manner in the course
of a non-violent felony. It should be observed that, currently, the vast
majority of American felony murder statutes limit the capital crime by
a selective list of felonies comparable to that here proposed, and that
New York is one of a very few jurisdictions that does not.
Finally, the most novel change appears in the exception extending a
defendant an opportunity to fight his way out of a felony murder charge
by persuading a jury, by way of affirmative defense, that he not only
had nothing to do with the killing itself but was unarmed and had no
idea that any of his confederates was armed or intended to engage in
any conduct dangerous to life. This phase of the provision is based upon
the theory that the felony murder doctrine, in its rigid automatic en-
velopment of all participants in the underlying felony, may be unduly
harsh in particular instances; and that some cases do arise, rare though
they may be, where it would be just and desirable to allow a non-killer
defendant of relatively minor culpability a chance of extricating himself
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function that succinctly defines the crime's scope. It throws light
on the meaning of the statute and is an available tool for the
resolution of doubt.
During 1964, the Commission received and reviewed numerous
suggestions, comments and criticisms concerning the proposed revised
Penal Law. 15 4 At no time, however, did anyone bring to the Com-
mission's attention the fact that, under the proposed felony murder
statute, two misdemeanors could form the foundation for a murder
conviction.'55 In fact, a person can discover the two concealed
misdemeanors 5 6 only if he scrutinizes the language of the statute
and is familiar with five other Penal Law sections' 57 . During the same
period, the Penal Law Revision Commission held public hearings
throughout New York State on the study bill. Whenever witnesses
or Commission members discussed the felony murder proposal, all
assumed that only a felony could constitute an underlying predicate.
No one noted that two misdemeanors were in the list of "dangerous
felonies.""' Thus, the legislature was never informed of this fact.
from liability for murder-though not, of course, from liability for the
underlying felony.
Id. (emphasis added).
Indeed, the concluding sentence contemplates that a defendant who successfully
invokes the affirmative defense does not extricate himself "from liability for the
underlying felony." Id.
154. In fact, in its own 1964 report to the legislature the Commission wrote:
The reasons for submitting this proposed Penal Law for study purposes
only are apparent. Its scope and magnitude are such that no legislative
body could hope to absorb it, much less analyze it thoroughly, in the
brief period between its submission and the termination of the current
legislative session. It proposes numerous controversial changes of both,
substance and form which call for legislative and public discussion.
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 14, 187th Sess. 9 (1964).
155. Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, § 210.05 (attempted escape in
the third degree); id. § 155.05 (attempted arson in the third degree).
156. See supra note 155.
157. Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133, §§ 10.00(4), 70.00(2), 110.05,
155.05, 210.05.
158. Proposed N.Y. Penal Law, supra note 133. For example, at a public hearing
held in Rochester on November 19, 1964, a representative of a committee of the
Monroe County Bar Association stated (hearing transcript 20-21):
Members of the Commission, the topic I have been assigned is that of
felony murder.
Now .... the Committee unanimously agree that presently constituted
1044 is somewhat odorous in that any felony, the commission of any
killing, intentional, accidental, or otherwise, in the act of any felony is
a little erroneous, and we do feel that some revision was in order.
Now .... the proposed change of the felony murder statute by limiting
it, first of all to the so-called dangerous felonies of robbery, burglary,
etc., we feel this is a very good byway of restriction. But, however, the
1987]
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The revised Penal Law introduced at the 1965 legislative session was
enacted into law, effective September 1, 1967.'"
second part of the restriction requiring that the act itself be one that is
inherently dangerous to human life, we feel that the restrictive effect of
both of these conditions is somewhat too great. In other words, first of
all, to limit it to the five or six dangerous felonies listed is fine, but
then in addition to say that the homicidal act itself is one that must be
inherently dangerous, the combination of the two would be somewhat
too restricted.
[At this point, the Commission Chairman Richard J. Bartlett interrupted
and said:]
Dangerousness is established by the underlying felony itself.
[The witness continued:]
Yes, in other words, if you restrict it to your burglary, robbery, arson,
etc., then any killing while in the commission of any of those dangerous
serious felonies would seem it would be a long way from the constituted
1044, wherein it is just any felony, any killing.
Hearing on Proposed N.Y. Penal Law before New York Law Revision Commission,
at 20-21 (Nov. 19, 1964) (statement of Joseph Demaria). At a public hearing held
in New York City on November 24, 1964, a representative of a committee of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York referred to the "substantial narrow-
ing of the crime of felony murder." Hearing on Proposed N.Y. Penal Law Before
New York Law Revision Commission, at 384 (Nov. 24, 1964) (statement of Richard
Uviller). The committee spokesman did not allude to the misdemeanors of attempted
escape in the second degree and attempted arson in the third degree which constituted
an unprecedented, and substantial expansion of the crime of felony murder.
At the same public hearing, the president of the District Attorneys' Association
objected to the language that "provides that the death of a person during the
commission or furtherance of a felony must be caused by an act inherently dangerous
to human life." Id. at 412 (statement of Bernard Smith). The Commission chair-
man, in response, referred to "our listing of the dangerous felonies." Id. at 413
(statement of Richard J. Bartlett).
Incidentally, while commenting on other provisions in the proposed draft in a
context that was wholly and completely unrelated to the felony murder doctrine,
the District Attorneys' representative recommended that the crime of escape in the
third degree "be more than a misdemeanor." Id. at 438 (statement of Bernard Smith).
This recommendation. was not adopted by the Commission; nor is it part of the
1965 Penal Law as enacted. See 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 1030, at 1529.
159. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 1030, at 1529. The bill was thoroughly debated before
being proposed:
In November of 1964, after the proposal had been in circulation for
almost six months, the Commission culminated its efforts to obtain
informed opinions on its work by holding a state-wide series of public
hearings in Albany, Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo and finally, three days
in New York City. Many witnesses testified, either as individuals or as
representatives of organizations, and a substantial number of them also
submitted position papers amplifying their testimony.
Upon completion of the hearings, the Commission, in a series of
meetings, undertook the re-examination of the study bill, taking into
consideration the suggestions and criticisms it had received and the ex-
pressions of opinion voiced at the public hearings. As a result, a number
of substantive changes and a greater number of formal and style changes
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Further evidence is found in its 1965 report commenting on the
changes in the statute resulting from the public hearings. 6° In this
report the Commission noted the differences between the 1964 study
bill and the one being submitted to the 1965 session 61 focusing on
the felony murder provision specifically.162
In the first sentence of this comment, the Commission referred
to "any felony or felony attempt."'' 63 This reference reflects the
Commission's understanding of the felony murder doctrine-with
respect to the attempt stage of a crime, the attempt must itself con-
stitute a felony murder conviction. Furthermore, the comment
specifically refers to the new requirement that the underlying crime
be a felony of an inherently violent or dangerous nature.'6" This
language thus belies an intent to broaden the application of the felony
murder statute.
In fact, in enumerating the predicate offenses, the principal thrust
were made. These are incorporated in the proposed revision which the
Commission is introducing for passage at the 1965 session.
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 188th Sess. 9 (1965).
160. See N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 188th Sess. 11 (1965).
161. See id. The report stated:
The proposed Penal Law being submitted for passage at the 1965 legislative
session differs in a number of respects from the study bill submitted at
the 1964 session. There are some important changes of substance, many
minor changes of substance, some structural changes and literally hundreds
of purely phraseological changes made for purposes of clarity and con-
formity. The ensuing comments do not, in the main, explain alterations
of mere form and language but are largely addressed to changes of
substance.
Id.
162. See id. at 30. The Commission made the following comment respecting
felony murder:
Under existing law, felony murder includes any killing, whether culpable
in itself or accidental, committed in the course of any felony or felony
attempt. ...
The [1964 study bill] felony murder section modifies that doctrine in
two respects: first, it limits the underlying crimes to a list of specified
felonies of an inherently violent or dangerous nature; and, second, it
requires that the killing itself be caused by "an act inherently dangerous
to human life". . ..
The latter element is eliminated in the new section by deletion of the
last quoted words. ...
It is believed that the harshness of the existing doctrine is sufficiently
alleviated by the requirement that the underlying crime be one of the
dangerous offenses enumerated without a further requirement that the
particular homicidal conduct also be of an "inherently dangerous" nature.
Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id.
164. See id.
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of the Commission's effort was to restrict rather than expand the
felony murder doctrine.16 5 The proposed statute contained only one
expansion-"immediate flight from the underlying felony"-which
the Commission expressly alluded to and discussed in its reports. 6,
Finally, in 1973, the New York Court of Appeals expressed its
understanding that only felonies involving violence or risk of physical
harm may form the basis for a felony murder conviction. 67 Hence,
if the legislature intended to exclude a non-violent felony then,, a
fortiori, it also intended to exclude every misdemeanor.
The unintended inclusion of the misdemeanor of attempted escape
in the second degree, therefore, extends the felony murder doctrine
beyond any rational function it was ever designed to serve. It is
simply anomalous to convict a person of felony murder when no
participant in the underlying conduct is criminally responsible for
a felony. The history of the felony murder doctrine,1 69 judicial
precedent, 70 and the reports of the Penal Law Revision Commission 7'
confirm this conclusion. Thus, a thorough reconsideration by the
legislature of the whole subject of felony murder is in order.
V. The Principal Deficiency of the Felony Murder Doctrine
Today, there is widespread recognition that punishment should
be tailored to a defendant's personal responsibility or moral guilt.
The defendant's state of mind should be the prime consideration in
determining the degree of his culpability with respect to all mala in
165. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
167. See People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 297 N.E.2d 85, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1973). The court stated:
[T]he legislature in 1965 ... [included] in the revised Penal Law a list
of specified felonies-all involving violence or substantial risk of physical
injury-as the only felonies forming a basis for felony murder. The
legislative purpose for this limitation was "to exclude from felony murder,
cases of accidental or not reasonably foreseeable fatality occurring in an
unlikely manner in the course of a non-violent felony."
32 N.Y.2d at 160, 297 N.E.2d at 87, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3), commentary at 236 (McKinney 1965); see also People v. Gladman, 41
N.Y.2d 123, 128, 359 N.E.2d 420, 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916 (1976) (legislature
intended that felony murder statute in revised Penal Law be limited in application
to violent felonies; certainly, it did not intend revised law to encompass misdemeanors).
168. See People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 297 N.E.2d 85, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1973).
169. See supra notes 40-121 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 122-71 and accompanying text.
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se offenses. A civilized principle of modern criminal law is that
criminal responsibility for causing a prohibited result is not justified
in the absence of some culpable mental state-i.e., mens rea-with
respect to the result element of the crime charged.172 The Supreme
Court in Enmund v. Florida73 has recently emphasized the impor-
tance of a nexus between mental culpability and criminal respon-
sibility, 174 and some thirty years ago, a prestigious Royal Commission
addressed the question of moral culpability and concluded that it
was inconsistent to find a person guilty of murder if he involuntarily
killed another in the course of committing a felony. 75 Indeed, the
proportionality concept of the eighth amendment requires some con-
nection between the punishment imposed and the defendant's moral
blameworthiness. 76 It is clear that the progressive tendency of Anglo-
172. See Hart, Book Review, 74 YALE L.J. 1325 (1965) (reviewing T. WOOTON,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963)).
173. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
174. See id. at 801. The Court wrote:
American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention-and
therefore his moral guilt-to be critical to . . . "the degree of [his]
criminal culpability" and the Court has found criminal penalties to be
unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing ....
[A defendant's] punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility
and moral guilt.
Id. at 800-801 (citation omitted).
175. See GR. BRIT. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT REPORT 34-35
(1949-53). The report stated:
The main objection to the doctrine can be briefly stated. It is a fun-
damental principle of our law . .. that no person is liable to be punished
... for an act which he has done unless it is also proved that he had
a wrongful intention. It is not inconsistent with this principle to hold
that, if a man foresaw the consequences of his act, he cannot be heard
to say that he did not intend to bring them about, even though he may
not have desired to do so. There is nothing "constructive" about this
rule, since "the only possible way of discovering a man's intention is
by looking at what he actually did, and by considering what must have
appeared to him at the time the natural consequence of his act ......
A person may therefore properly be convicted of murder if he has caused
death either by an act intended to kill or do grievous bodily harm and
committed with reckless disregard of the consequences. But it is quite
inconsistent with the general principle of criminal liability to say that,
if a person kills another inadvertently while committing a felony ...
malice is implied and he is guilty of murder, although he neither intended
to cause death or grievous bodily harm nor foresaw that he was likely
to do so. Moreover, it is argued, not only is it unjust to punish a man
for an effect which he neither foresaw nor intended, but to exact such
a penalty would in practice seldom be effective as a deterrent to others.
Id. (citation omitted).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Enmund, the Court held that the eighth
amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on the non-killer defendant
19871
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American law during the past century has been to repudiate severe
penalties for unintended results.' 77 Today, aside from offenses of a
strict liability nature (that is, regulatory offenses), modern criminal
law does not predicate liability on objective conduct by an actor
that causes a particular prohibited result. "'
The felony murder doctrine, however, contravenes this philosophy
by convicting the defendant of the paradigmatic malum in se crime-
murder-by using a theory of strict liability. Thus, a person is guilty
of felony murder even when the victim's death was demonstrably
unintended or concededly accidental. Under the traditional felony
murder doctrine, the jury does not make an affirmative finding of
defendant's culpability. I7 9 The issue is objectively and starkly simple:
Did death occur during the commission of a felony?
convicted of felony murder who, merely aiding others in the commission of a
violent felony, did not intend that a killing take place. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
The Court stressed two factors: the lack of a legitimate penological justification and
the lack of a justifiable retribution interest. See id. at 801. Application of the
death penalty hinges on the defendant's "culpability, not on that of those who
committed the robbery and shot the victims, for we insist on 'individualized
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence,' ...
It is fundamental that 'causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely
than causing the same harm unintentionally.' " Id. at 798 (quoting H. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 62 (1968)).
177. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
The Gypsum Court, emphasizing the severity of the sanctions specified by Congress
for Sherman Act violations, held that in a criminal action the result element of
the Act (fixing prices) could no longer be deemed one of strict liability and that
it would thereafter require proof of intent. See id. at 443. The Court carefully
and elaborately defined the requisite mens rea for future prosecutions. See id. at
436-43.
178. See Gegan, supra note 3, at 586. "If one had to choose ... the most basic
principle of the criminal law in general . . . it would be that criminal liability for
causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental
state in respect to that result." Id.
179. In People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1965), the California Supreme Court cogently observed that the felony murder
doctrine "erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability." Id.
at 783, 402 P.2d at 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 446; see also Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morissette, Justice Jackson expressed this idea in the follow-
ing, much-quoted, passage:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human
will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and
punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's
familiar exculpatory . . . "But I didn't mean to" ....
Id. at 250-51; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 73, at 560 n.81 ("[tihe implication
from this terminology is that there is something wrong with this type of murder;
it is all right to punish regular murder, but it is not quite right to pretend that
something is murder which is not").
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Thus, felony murder, a quintessential strict liability offense, erodes
the link between criminal liability and moral culpability. It embraces
a situation in which a person is killed because of reckless conduct,
ordinary negligence or a pure accident. Indeed, it is irrelevant whether
the victim's death was highly probable, conceivable, possible or
wholly unforeseeable.
In addition, the felony murder doctrine is often unnecessary. When
felons are acting intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a "kill-if-
need-be" plan, the state may prove the guilt of a conspiratorial
non-killer without the felony murder doctrine on broad principles
of accessorial responsibility. 80 Concluding that it is difficult to discern
a principled argument in favor of the felony murder doctrine the
American Law Institute recommended the abolition of the doctrine
with the caveat: For the purpose of establishing murder by an act
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting "extreme in-
difference to the value of human life,"'' courts may find that the
fact that the actor is "engaged or is an accomplice in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing robbery,
rape by force or intimidation, arson, burglary, kidnapping or fe-
lonious escape ' 182 creates a rebuttable presumption that the required
indifference and. recklessness existed.' 83
180. See Seibold, supra note 3, at 135. Seibold states:
It is submitted that this is one of the most persuasive arguments in favor
of abolition of the doctrine: it is not necessary to the establishment of
criminal liability in the majority of cases in which it has been applied,
and its application to those cases in which death occurred wholly by
accident, i.e., without intent or likelihood of harm, is contrary to the
modern trend toward establishment of culpability as the basis of criminal
liability.
Id. at 135 n.4.
181. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (Tent. Draft 1959).
182. Id.
183. Id. In support of this proposal, the Model Penal Code reporters made these
comments:
We are . . . entirely clear that it is indefensible to use the sanctions that
the law employs to deal with murder, unless there is at least a finding
that the actor's conduct manifested an extreme indifference to the value
of human life. The fact that the actor was engaged in a crime of the
kind that is included in the usual ... felony murder enumeration or
was an accomplice in such crime will frequently justify such a finding.
The probability is high enough ... to warrant the presumption of extreme
indifference .... But liability depends, as we believe it should, upon
the crucial finding. The result may not differ often under such a for-
mulation from that which would be reached under the present rule. But
what is more important is that a conviction on this basis rests upon
sound ground.
Id. § 201.2 (comment 4); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The
Supreme Court noted, "[tihe constitutional necessity of proof beyond a reasonable
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In addition, in 1953, the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
detailed the many deficiencies of the "Constructive Malice" doc-
trine-the British version of the felony murder doctrine-and rec-
ommended that it be abolished.1 4 Recently, the Michigan Supreme
Court, alluding to the incongruity of permitting a murder conviction
when the result element is one of strict liability, abolished the
common law felony murder doctrine.'
doubt is not confined to those defendants who are morally blameless .... Under
our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to complain that he has been
unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as a burglar." Id. at 323-24.
184. See GR. BRIT. RoYAL CommissloN ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 29-41 (1949-53).
The Commission report stated:
This doctrine of "constructive malice" has been much criticised on
grounds both of humanity and of logic. We think there can be no doubt
that the severity of the old rules has been mitigated by judicial decisions
during the last 100 years and that the law is now no longer as stated
by Stephen . ... So far as we are aware, the doctrine that any killing
in the course of the commission of any felony is murder has never been
expressly overruled by the courts; and judicial witnesses gave it as their
opinion that in strict theory this was probably still the law. They hastened
to add, however, that in practice it had been dead for many years, and
that if the killing was unintentional a modern Judge would direct the
jury to bring in a verdict of manslaughter unless the felony was one
involving violence . . . .As we have seen, the practical operation of the
law, if not the law itself, has been greatly mitigated by the courts. Our
witnesses were unanimous that the ancient rule was absurd and objec-
tionable . . . .At the same time the amendment of the law was not of
great practical importance, since nowadays neither prosecutor nor Judge
nor jury would wish to convict a man of murder, if he never intended
to kill anyone and was doing something, however wrong, which could
not be reasonably regarded as imperilling anyone's life . . . .We have
no doubt that, as a matter of general principle, persons ought not to
be punished for consequences of their acts which they did not intend
or foresee. The doctrine of constructive malice clearly infringes this
principle and in our view it ought to be abolished .... We are satisfied
...that the representatives of the police, and other witnesses who were
opposed to any change in the existing law, exaggerated the dangerous
consequences likely to result from such a change. As we have seen, the
practical effect of the doctrine of constructive malice at the present day
is very limited, and we cannot think that its abolition would lead to
any striking change in the practice of the courts.
Id.
185. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 733, 299 N.W.2d 304, 328-29 (1980). The
court stated:
The basic infirmity of felony murder lies in its failure to correlate, to
any degree, criminal liability with moral culpability. It permits one to
be punished for a killing, usually with the most severe penalty in the
law, without requiring proof of any mental state with respect to the
killing. This incongruity is simply more than we are willing to permit
our criminal jurisprudence to bear.
Id. at 744, 299 N.W.2d at 334 (Ryan, J., concurring).
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VI. Judicial and Legislative Efforts to Limit the Scope of the
Felony Murder Doctrine
Judicial interpretation of the felony murder doctrine has varied
considerably. A number of states, including New York prior to 1967,
have expanded the scope of the felony murder doctrine by use of
the vicarious liability concept.8 6 These courts have held that a person
who participates in a crime of the first or second degree or as an
accessory before the fact, is criminally responsible for any death
caused during the commission of the felony. 87 Many courts in the
United States, however, recognizing the inherent practical and the-
oretical deficiencies of the felony murder doctrine, have limited the
broad scope of its application by employing the canons of statutory
construction. 1 8
186. Courts in this category have adopted different reasoning to attain their
result. See, e.g., People v. Michalow, 229 N.Y. 325, 128 N.E. 228 (1920) (immaterial
whether one or all conspirators intended to use force, whether armed or unarmed,
or actually present when murder committed); People v. Giro, 197 N.Y. 152, 90
N.E. 432 (1910) (conspirators engaged in commission of felony are engaged in
commission of crime and homicide within common purpose); Ruloff v. People, 45
N.Y. 213 (1871) (all present at time of committing offense are principals although
only one acts, if confederates engaged in common design of which offense is part).
187. See supra note 186.
188. See, e.g., Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 227, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (1970)
("[w]e do want to make clear how shaky are the basic premises on which [the
felony murder doctrine] rests. With so weak a foundation, it behooves us not to
extend it further and indeed, to restrain it within the bounds it has always known").
Twenty years ago, the California Supreme Court "recognized that the felony
murder doctrine expresses a highly artificial concept that deserves no extension
beyond its required application. Indeed, the rule itself has been abandoned by the
courts of England, where it had its inception. It has been subjected to severe and
sweeping criticism." People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582-83, 414 P.2d 353, 360,
51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1966).
Three years ago, that same court made these comments:
Defendant emphasizes the dubious origins of the felony murder doctrine,
the many strictures levelled against it over the years by courts and scholars,
and the legislative and judicial limitations that have increasingly circum-
scribed its operation. We do not disagree with these criticisms; indeed,
our opinions make it clear we hold no brief for the felony murder rule.
We have repeatedly stated that felony murder is a "highly artificial
concept" which "deserves no extension beyond its required application"
.... And we have recognized that the rule is much censured "because
it anachronistically resurrects from a bygone age a 'barbaric' concept
that has been discarded in the place of its origin" . . . and because "in
almost all cases in which it is applied it is unnecessary" and "it erodes
the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability .... .
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 462, 668 P.2d 697, 708-709, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390,
401 (1983) (quoting Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 582, 583 n.6, 414 P.2d at 360, 360 n.6,
51 Cal. Rptr. at 232 n.6; People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d
130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965)).
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Although the original felony murder doctrine applied to "any
felony,"'' 9 the majority of states, have rejected this idea by enum-
erating specific felonies within their respective felony murder stat-
utes.1 90 In states that have failed to enumerate the predicate felonies,
many courts, engaging in statutory construction, have required that
the felonious act be dangerous to life' 9l a common law felony or
a felony that is malum in se. Some of these courts look to the
statutory definition of the felony in the abstract-that is, abstracted
from the particular factual situation before the court.1 92
All of the states with nonenumerated felony murder statutes have,
by virtue of judicial construction of the statute, adopted a so-called
"merger rule"-requiring the predicate felony to be distinct from the
homicidal act itself. 93 For example, the felony of assault is so closely
related to the act of killing that it should be regarded as merged with
the homicidal act.
Prior to 1967, New York County applied the merger rule. 94 Al-
189. See People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 51, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738, 201 N.Y.S.2d
328, 331 (1960). "Although most jurisdictions limit [the] application [of the felony
murder doctrine] to specified violent felonies (e.g., arson, rape, robbery and burglary),
New York and the minority make homicide during the commission of any felony
murder in the first degree." Id. at 51 n.2, 167 N.E.2d at 738 n.2, 201 N.Y.S.2d
at 331 n.2 (emphasis in original).
190. See id. These predicate felonies generally are violent or clearly dangerous
to human life. In some of these states, a killing in the course of a non-enumerated
felony is characterized as manslaughter.
191. See State v. Underwood, 228 Kan. 294, 615 P.2d 153 (1980); Annotation,
What felonies are inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life for purposes
of felony murder doctrine, 50 A.L.R.3D 397 (1973).
192. See People v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971).
The California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the felony of escape
from prison is inherently dangerous in the abstract; thus, in that state a felony
escape may not support a felony murder prosecution. Id. at 51-52, 489 P.2d at
1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
193. See Annotation, Application of felony murg'er doctrine where the felony
relied upon is an includable offense within the homicide, 40 A.L.R.3D 1341 (1971);
see also Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, 6 FoRDnAm L. REv. 43, 46-52 (1937).
194. See People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 159-60, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87, 344
N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (1973). In 1973, the New York Court of Appeals explained the
pre-1967 merger doctrine as follows:
[The] merger doctrine [was developed] ... to remedy a fundamental
defect in the old felony-murder statute .... Under that statute, any
felony, including assault, could be the predicate for a felony murder.
Since, a fortiori, every homicide, not excusable or justifiable, occurs
during the commission of assault, every homicide would constitute a
felony murder.
Id. That same court, 58 years earlier, had also held that the felony of unlawful
possession of a firearm was merged in the homicidal act. People v. Marendi, 213
N.Y. 600, 606, 107 N.E. 1058, 1060 (1915).
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though New York's pre-1967 felony murder statute embraced "any
felony," the court of appeals engaged in statutory construction "to
remedy a fundamental defect in the old felony murder statute,' '9 95
and excised two felonies from the scope of the statute.
Although the minimal requirement in a felony murder prosecution
is the coincidence of homicide and felony, most courts require
something more than mere coincidence-that is, the killing must be
the result of a felonious act done in furtherance of the felonious
plan. 96 Some states have also required that the victim's death be
a natural and probable consequence of the felonious act and that
such result be proximately caused. 97 Most courts have required that
the victim be some person other than a participant and that the
person causing the victim's death be one of the participants in the
underlying felony. 98
As a means to limit the operation of the felony murder doctrine,
some courts have imposed temporal and spatial limitations on the
predicate felony by narrowly construing the period during which the
felony is in the process of commission. 99 In New York, prior to
1967, only killings committed during the period between the inception
of the attempt to commit the felony2°°-and the attempt itself was
always a felony-and the consummation of the felony or the frus-
tration and abandonment of the attempt were treated as felony
murder. 201
195. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d at 159, 297 N.E.2d at 87, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2) (West 1982); see also Powers v.
Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, -, 61 S.W. 735, 741-42 (1901); Commonwealth
v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502-508, 436 N.E.2d 400, 407-10 (1982); People v. Aaron,
409 Mich. 672, 700, 299 N.W.2d 304, 313 (1980); Burton v. State, 122 Tex. Crim.
363, __ , 55 S.W.2d 813, 814 (1932).
198. See Annotation, Criminal liability where act of killing is done by one resisting
felony or other unlawful act committed by defendant, 56 A.L.R.3D 239 (1974);
see also State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 209-11, 374 A.2d 20, 21-22 (1977) (regressive
to extend felony murder rule to lethal acts if third persons not in furtherance of
felonious scheme).
199. See Annotation, What constitutes termination of felony for purpose of
felony murder rule, 58 A.L.R.3D 851 (1974); see also People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y.
140, 148, 186 N.E. 422, 424 (1933) (killing must occur while defendants were engaged
in securing plunder or doing something immediately connected with underlying crime
to be felony murder); People v. Huther, 184 N.Y. 237, 243-44, 77 N.E. 6, 8-9 (1906)
(assault on police officer by defendant in flight from burglary scene merged in
homicide and was improper basis for felony murder).
200. See People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 133, 65 N.E. 989, 992 (1903) (court
discusses when felony may be said to have begun, i.e., when attempt stage is reached).
201. The question of when the felony (either the attempt or the crime itself)
ended was constantly litigated. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440, 231
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A number of state legislatures have recently downgraded the of-
fense of felony murder and consequently reduced the punishment. 20 2
Several recently revised state codes expressly require proof of a mens
rea beyond the intent to commit a felony.203 Other states have simply
abolished the felony murder doctrine. 2°4 At least one commentator
supports this latter approach.205
N.E.2d 722, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 928 (1968) (felony
murder must occur while defendant or confederate was engaged in securing plunder or
committing act immediately connected to underlying crime); People v. Ryan, 263
N.Y. 298, 189 N.E. 225 (1934) (application of felony murder rule confined to
killing committed between inception of attempt to commit felony and consummation
or abandonment of attempt); People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 186 N.E. 422 (1933)
(killing must be immediately connected with underlying crime); People v. Moran,
246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927) (if defendant trying to escape, first felony
necessarily over and assault thereafter resulting in death is merged in homicide);
People v. Marwig, 227 N.Y. 382, 125 N.E. 535 (1919) (error to charge attempted
escape proper as basis for felony murder when attempted robbery had been aban-
doned before shooting occurred).
202. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2) (West 1982). In Wisconsin, felony
murder is a class B felony. Every class B felony is punishable by imprisonment
not to exceed 20 years. Id. at § 939.50.
203. Delaware's first degree murder statute requires that the defendant cause
death recklessly in the course of a felony or with at least criminal negligence in
the course of one of the enumerated felonies. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636
(1974). It defines as second degree murder a death caused with criminal negligence
in the course of non-enumerated felonies. Id. § 635.
204. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-07 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985). The Kentucky and Hawaii legislatures have abolished
the felony murder doctrine. The commentary to Hawaii's murder statute succinctly
states the reason why the state has eliminated the doctrine:
Even in its limited formulation the felony murder rule is still objectionable.
It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent, or reckless
homicide into a murder simply because, without more, the killing was
in furtherance of a criminal objective of some defined class. Engaging
in certain penally-prohibited behavior may, of course, evidence a reck-
lessness sufficient to establish manslaughter, or a practical certainty or
intent, with respect to causing death, sufficient to establish murder, but
such a finding is an independent determination which must rest on the
facts of each case .... In recognition of the trend toward, and the
substantial body of criticism supporting, the abolition of the felony murder
rule, and because of the extremely questionable results which the rule
has worked in other jurisdictions, the Code has eliminated from our law
the felony murder rule.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-07, commentary at 347 (1985).
205. The reporter of the Model Penal Code, who was also a member of the
New York State Penal Law Revision Commission (1961-1970), preferred "to follow
the British example by dispensing with constructive murder wholly, but such a
course was thought to be impolitic, given the weight of prosecutive opposition."
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1446 (1986). He continued:
The numerous modifications and restrictions placed upon the common
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VII. The Culhane Case
Just one year after the enactment of the revised Penal Law a felony
murder *case arose in which the predicate crime was the class A
misdemeanor of attempted escape in the second degree.206
In this case, People v. Culhane,207 the state charged the defendants
Culhane and McGivern with murder in a one-count indictment. 208
The underlying predicate for the crime was attempted escape in the
second degree-a class A misdemeanor. 209
law felony murder doctrine by courts and legislatures reflect dissatisfaction
with the harshness and injustice of the rule. Even though the felony
murder doctrine survives in this country, it bears increasingly less re-
semblance to the traditional felony murder concept. To the extent that
these modifications reduce the scope and significance of the common
law doctrine, they also call into question the continued existence of the
doctrine itself.
Id.
206. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05(7) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
207. 33 N.Y.2d 90, 305 N.E.2d 469, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1973). The facts are
related in the court's opinion:
On September 13, 1968 three prisoners, Culhane, Bowerman, and McGivern
were being taken by auto from the Auburn State Prison to White Plains
in connection with a coram nobis hearing on behalf of Culhane. The
two escorting Deputy Sheriffs were riding in the front seat of the car.
The car was Deputy Sheriff Fitzgerald's personal car so there was no
screen separating the prisoners from the two Deputy Sheriffs, Singer and
Fitzgerald, who were riding in the front seat. Each deputy carried a .38
caliber revolver at his side. Prisoners Culhane and McGivern were hand-
cuffed to a loop in front of their security belt. Each belt buckled in
the back. Prisoner Bowerman's belt was fastened in the front with a
chain and a hasp to which the handcuffs were attached. None of the
belts were attached to each other. At the time of the incident in question,
Culhane was sitting behind the driver,. McGivern was in the middle and
Bowerman was on the right, behind the passenger side of the front seat.
They never reached White Plains, for the trip ended in violence in Ulster
County, during the course of which the appellants were wounded and
the prisoner Bowerman and Deputy Sheriff Fitzgerald were killed.
Id. at 95, 305 N.E.2d at 472, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
208. Id. The indictment read:
The Grand Jury of the County of Ulster, by this indictment, accuse the
defendants of the crime of murder, committed as follows: The defendants,
in the County of Ulster, State of New York, on or about the 13th day
of September, 1968, acting alone and with each other and with" another
person, attempted to commit the crime of escape in the second degree
and, in the course and futherance of such crime, the defendants caused
the death of William Fitzgerald, not a participant in the said crime, by
gunshot wounds from a revolver.
Id. The indictment charged neither defendant with intentional murder nor reckless
depraved indifference murder. See id. Nor were the defendants charged with reckless
manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide. See id.
209. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05(7) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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The first trial of the defendants ended in a mistrial because the
jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. 210 Found guilty and sentenced
to death at their second trial,21 ' the defendants appealed directly to
the court of appeals. ' 12 In their appeal brief, the defendants raised
ten points. The eighth point, consisting of four and one-half pages,
addressed the misdemeanor issue. 213 The district attorney, however,
argued that the misdemeanor-felony distinction was purely seman-
tic. 214 In ordering a new trial the court failed to address the issue
of a misdemeanor serving as a foundation for a felony murder
conviction. 25 Rather, it based its reversal on an error in the selection
of prospective jurors. 21 6
210. See People v. Culhane, 57 A.D.2d 418, 395 N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep't 1977),
aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 757, 380 N.E.2d 315, 408 N.Y.S.2d 489, cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1047 (1978).
211. See People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 305 N.E.2d 469, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381
(1973).
212. See id.
213. Appellant's Brief at 68-72, People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 305 N.E.2d
469, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1973). The brief stated:
It appears that the State Commission on Revision of the Penal Law was
unaware that attempted escape second degree is now a misdemeanor
.... It is respectfully submitted that inclusion of attempted second
degree escape as a predicate for first degree murder deprives defendant
of substantive due process and of his right to equal protection of the
law .... Not only is the whole history of the felony murder doctrine
inconsistent with the inclusion of a misdemeanor among the underlying
crimes for constructive first degree murder, but to expand that doctrine
to lesser offenses is to arbitrarily-and hence unconstitutionally-allow
conviction of a misdemeanor for the gravest of crimes.
Id.
214. Respondent's Brief at 17, People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 305 N.E.2d
469, 350 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1973). The brief countered:
Based as it is on a false premise, the fallacy of this semantic argument
is readily recognized. Defendants were not charged with attempted escape.
They were charged with felony murder. The one count indictment is
carefully couched in the language of the statute. Said statute enumerates
a list of certain crimes, all involving violence or real risk of physical
injury, and deliberately declares that the commission or the attempt to
commit any such specified crime forms the basis for felony murder.
Escape in the second degree is one of the specified crimes .... Statutory
language should be interpreted according to its natural and obvious
meaning .... Patently, defendants' false conception of the function of
the underlying crime in a felony murder prosecution would place a truly
evil premium on the failure of a wrongful act. And it can be considered
certain that the Legislature never intended that the frustration of a heinous
crime be so rewarded.
Id.
215. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d at 110, 305 N.E.2d at 483, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 400 (1973).
216. See id. The court, in an opinion by Judge Wachtler, wrote:
In view of our recent decision in People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499,
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In the retrial, 27 each defendant again was convicted of felony
murder and this time sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five years
to life. 218 The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the
judgments of conviction in a three to two decision.2 9
In their appeal to the court of appeals, the defendants failed to
raise or reargue the misdemeanor issue. 220 In contrast, in the state's
brief the district attorney argued: "[t]he total evidence established
defendants' participation in the underlying felony and thus proved
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. '221 The district attorney failed
to note, however, that the case involved no "underlying felony."
The court affirmed the order of the appellate division without ad-
dressing the "underlying misdemeanor" issue.222
Thus, in Culhane, the murder conviction was based on the felony
murder theory without any underlying felony. The fact that at least
three other theories may have supported a murder charge is legally
and constitutionally irrelevant since the prosecutor chose to proffer
only one theory. 223 If this case had arisen before the enactment of
the revised Penal Law, the defendants, in attempting to escape, would
have been guilty of a felony and thus a "real" felony murder. 224
346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 300 N.E.2d 139 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973), declaring this State's death penalty statute unconstitutional, we
should-as a minimum-remand this case for resentencing. The appellants,
however, raise several issues which they claim require reversal of the
conviction and a new trial, one of which-relating to the court's refusal
to excuse four prospective jurors for cause-has substantial merit.
Id. at 95, 305 N.E.2d at 472, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
217. See People v. Culhane, 57 A.D.2d 418, 395 N.Y.S.2d 517 (3d Dep't 1977),




220. People v. Culhane, 45 N.Y.2d 757, 380 N.E.2d 315, 408 N.Y.S.2d 489,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
221. District Attorney's Brief at 14, People v. Culhane, 45 N.Y.2d 757, 380
N.E.2d 315, 408 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1978).
222. Culhane, 45 N.Y.2d at 759-60, 380 N.E.2d at 317, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
.223. In People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927), the New York
Court of Appeals stated that it:
[M]ay not "sustain a conviction erroneously secured on one theory on
the conjecture that it would have followed just the same if the correct
theory had been applied" . . . .A criminal, however shocking his crime,
is not to answer for it with forfeiture of life or liberty till tried and
convicted in conformity with law.
Id. at 105, 158 N.E. at 37.
224. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 261, 1694, 1699 (McKinney Supp. 1966). In 1984, the
legislature amended the escape sections of the Penal Law to provide that a person
is guilty of a class E felony if he attempts to escape from custody after having
.1987]
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Under the new law, however, an attempt to escape from custody
is only a class A misdemeanor. 225
VIII. Recommendations
It is clear that the felony murder statute contains an error that
egregiously expands the scope of the doctrine that, if anything,
should be limited. It is therefore recommended that the error be
corrected-either by the legislature, or, until the legislature acts, by
judicial interpretation.
A. Recommendation for the Judiciary
No court may sit as a super-legislature, with the power to abrogate
a statute judicially, merely because it is unwise. 226 The wisdom of
legislation is never a proper subject for judicial inquiry; that is,
judges may not legislate under the guise of statutory construction. 227
If the legislative intent is not in doubt, judges may not revise a
statute. 228 Rather, a court is required to ascertain and carry out
legislative intent. 229
If it were clear that the legislature purposefully and knowingly
included a misdemeanor as a predicate for a felony murder con-
viction, then a court may not, under the guise of statutory con-
bjeen convicted of a class A or class B felony. 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 277, at 483-
84. Prior to this amendment and subsequent to September 1, 1967 (the revised
penal law), such conduct constituted a class A misdemeanor. 1967 N.Y. Laws ch.
791, at 1310-11. And, as noted, for many years prior to 1967, such conduct
constituted a felony and in several reported decisions properly formed a predicate
for a felony murder prosecution. See supra notes 87-121 and accompanying text.
Notwithstanding the historical classification, the fact remains that upon a literal
reading of the present felony murder statute, a misdemeanor may serve as a predicate
for a conviction. In addition, even after the 1984 amendment, no reported decision
in New York or elsewhere has ever expressly approved the idea that a misdemeanor
may form the predicate for a felony murder conviction. See People v. Lozano,
107 Misc. 2d 345, 348, 434 N.Y.S.2d 588, 590 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
225. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05 (McKinney 1966). Indeed, at the second Culhane
trial, the court gave these instructions to the jury: "By the way, the crime of
attempted escape in the second degree is a misdemeanor." Record at 1392, People
v. Culhane, 45 N.Y.2d 757, 380 N.E.2d 315, 408 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1978).
226. See People ex rel Culhane v. Sullivan, 133 Misc. 2d 181, 189-90, 506
N.Y.S.2d 620, 626 (1986).
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 242 N.E.2d 802, 804, 295
N.Y.S.2d 625, 628 (1968). "[A] primary command to the judiciary in the inter-
pretation of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the purpose of the Legislature.
In finding such purpose, one should look to the entire statute, its legislative history
and the statutes of which it is made a part." Id.
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struction, excise that crime from the murder statute. In the absence
of a clear, explicit and unambiguous indication of its intention,
however, a court may readily and properly infer that the legislature
did not intend to overturn the long established rule of law, that
only a felony may serve as a foundation for a felony murder
prosecution.
What policies did the legislature have in mind when it enacted
the existing felony murder statute? 230 Penal Law section 5.00 offers
an instructive rule: "The general rule that a penal statute is to be
strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions
herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms
to promote justice and effect the objects of the law." ' 231
It would be improper to interpret the felony murder statute in
the abstract, without taking into consideration its antecedents. Thus,
in construing New York's present felony murder statute, a court
properly may consider its pre-enactment history, 23 2 its enactment
history233 and its post-enactment history.23 4 These histories reveal that
the legislature intended that the actor or his accomplice be engaged
in a felony at the time of the killing. 233  That determination is
consistent with legislative intent, justice and common sense.
1. The Legislative History of the Felony Murder Statute
The 1965 felony murder statute sought to abolish the former "any
felony" rule and to limit the predicate to certain violent felonies. 236
Neither the Penal Law Revision Commission nor the legislature
intended to broaden the felony murder doctrine to include a mis-
demeanor. 237 An examination of all the previous felony murder
statutes in New York28 and the legislative history of the statute
supports this conclusion. 23 9
230. See Cherkis v. Impellitteri, 307 N.Y. 132, 148, 120 N.E.2d 530, 538 (1954).
("[i]t is a familiar canon of construction that statutes are to be interpreted so as
to fulfill policies which the Legislature evidently had in mind").
231. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 1975).
232. See supra notes 40-121 and accompanying text.
233. "In construing a statute, the courts frequently consider the common law
rule and then follow the course of legislation on the subject, the lineage of the
act being thought to illuminate the intent of the legislature." N.Y. STATUTES LAW
§ 124 (McKinney 1971).
234. See supra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 122-72 and accompanying text.
236. 1965 N.Y. Laws 1529.
237. See supra notes 40-205 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 40-205 and accompanying text.
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From 1829 until the enactment of the revised Penal Law in 1967,
the clearly expressed legislative policy of New York was to include
only felonious conduct as the predicate for a felony murder con-
viction.240 The Reports of the Penal Law Revision Commission are
extremely persuasive on the question of legislative purpose. Those
reports conclusively demonstrate that the purpose was to narrow the
scope of the felony murder doctrine by rejecting the prior "any
felony" rule and specifying certain felonies that may serve as a
predicate for conviction.24'
The felony murder statute should be construed in the light of
common sense. It should be conclusively presumed that the 1965
legislature intended to enact a felony murder statute that was rea-
sonable. That statute, accordingly, must be given an interpretation
consonant with that presumption. It is simply unreasonable to sup-
pose that the legislature intended to broaden the felony murder
doctrine to include a misdemeanor.
2. Judicial Role in Interpreting Statutes
To promote and further legislative intent, courts may, if required,
modify language, add or delete punctuation, add language, transpose
words, or delete words when their presence is obviously a mistake. 242
In fact, judicial variation of the literal meaning of statutory language
often either enlarges or narrows the scope of the statute.2"3 In order
to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, a court may be required
to avoid interpreting words in a statute literally,2 4 i.e., statutory
240. See supra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 161, 474 N.E.2d 567, 571,
485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (1984).
243. Id. In this case, because of overriding policy concerns, the Court deleted
words from a penal statute and thereby enlarged its scope.
244. See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Learned Hand made this oft-quoted
observation:
There is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language-
be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract-than to read the
words literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is
meant to secure. Nor is a court ever less likely to do its duty than when,
with an obsequious show of submission, it disregards the overriding
purpose because the particular occasion which has arisen, was not fore-
seen.
Id.
At one time, courts interpreted statutes in accordance with the plain meaning
rule-that statutory language should be interpreted according to its natural and
obvious meaning. See, e.g., This rule of literalism required a court to put on
blinders and obscure from view everything but the statutory text.
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language is subservient to legislative intent. 24 5 The literal meaning of
words in a statute should never be allowed to defeat or frustrate
legislative purpose. 2 6 The proper judicial construction of a statute
requires recognition and implementation of the underlying purpose.24 7
A judge performing this sensitive function should be literate, not literal.
3. How Courts Should Interpret the Felony Murder Statute
The spirit of the existing felony murder statute-as distinguished
from its strictly literal meaning-is that only felonious conduct may
For the last fifty years, however, the United States has moved away from this
literal approach and instead adopted an approach that considers extrinsic evidence
of legislative intent whenever such evidence is persuasive. See Argosy Ltd. v.
Hannigan, 404 F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968). "[S]tatutory construction must not
occur in a vacuum. Statutes are contextual as well as textual .... Their proper
interpretation requires more than mere linguistic seriation. Courts must also look
to the logic of [the legislature] and to the broad ... policy which prompted the
legislation." Id. (citation omitted).
245. See People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 152, 8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1937). "In
the interpretation of statutes, the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to
be accomplished must be considered .... Literal meanings of words are not to be
adhered to or suffered to 'defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended
to be promoted' . . . ." Id.; accord Capone v. Weaver, 6 N.Y.2d 307, 309, 160
N.E.2d 602, 603, 189 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (1959); New York Post Corp. v. Leibowitz,
2 N.Y.2d 677, 685, 143 N.E.2d 256, 260, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (1957).
246. See People ex rel. Twenty-Third Street R.R. v. Commissioners of Taxes, 95
N.Y. 554, 558-59 (1884). The court stated:
It is the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes to ascertain
the intention of the lawmakers, and this is generally accomplished by a
literal reading of the words used. But there are many cases where the
words do not express that intention perfectly, but exceed it or fall short
of it, and then it is allowable to adopt what writers upon the civil law
sometimes call a rational interpretation and to collect the intention from
rational or probable conjecture only.
Id.
247. See 2A F. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54.06, at 582 (4th ed.
1984) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND]. Sutherland maintains:
When the natural or literal meaning of statutory language embraces
applications which would not serve the policy or purpose for which the
statute was enacted .... the courts may construe it restrictively in order
not to give it an effect beyond its equity or spirit. "It is a familiar rule,
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers." A restricted interpretation is usually applied where the effect
of a literal interpretation will result in injustice and absurdity, or, in
the words of one court, the language must be so unreasonable "as to
shock general common sense" . . . . The language of criminal statutes
has often been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent
with the legislative plan.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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serve as a foundation for invocation of the felony murder doctrine. 248
The fact that the felony murder statute may be facially unambiguous
does not preclude a court from disregarding the literal words249 in
order to effectuate legislative intent. 20 Courts should not sacrifice
248. See People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 359 N.E.2d 420, 390 N.Y.S.2d
912 (2d Dep't 1976). The New York Court of Appeals observed that "[t]he 1967
Penal Law limited the application of the felony murder concept to nine serious
and violent predicate felonies." Id. at 128, 359 N.E.2d at 424, 390 N.Y.S.2d at
916.
249. See People ex rel. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N.Y. 574,
585 (1883). "[A] principle of construction of universal authority is that which
requires the court to limit and restrict' the operation of a statute when its language,
if applied in its literal sense, would lead to an absurdity, or manifest injustice."
Id. (citation omitted); see also Kelly v. Sugarman, 12 N.Y.2d 298, 300, 189 N.E.2d
613, 615, 239 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (1963). "Words contained in a statute must, of
course, be given the meaning to which they are reasonably entitled but this does
not mean that we must accept the language in all of its sheer literalness and forget
completely the object which the statute was designed to accomplish." Id.
250. See New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 343 N.E.2d
735, 381 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975). The court stated:
It has been said often, but with less than meticulous analysis, that an
"unambiguous" statute permits of no inquiry into legislative intention
.... Absence of facial ambiguity is, however, rarely, if ever, conclusive.
The words men use are never absolutely certain in meaning; the limitations
of finite man and the even greater limitations of his language see to
that. Inquiry into the meaning of statutes is never foreclosed at the
threshhold; what happens is that often the inquiry into intention results
in the conclusion that either there is no ambiguity in the statute, or that
for policy or other reasons the prior history will be rejected in favor of
the purportedly explicit statement of the statute ... Then it is often
said with more pious solemnity than accuracy, that the clarity of the
statute precludes inquiry into the antecedent legislative history. As the
Supreme Court stated ... : "There is, of course, no more persuasive
evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature
undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient
in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such
cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led
to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the
words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the
plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable
one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole"
this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When
aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is
available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use,
however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination." The
interpretation of the meaning of statutes, as applied to justiciable con-
troversies, is exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires one body
of public servants, the judges, to construe the meaning of what another
body, the legislators, has said. Obviously there is danger that the courts'
conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by
the judges' own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body.
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the manifest legislative purpose of the felony murder statute to a literal
reading of the words used in defining the crime. 21 When words
have inadvertently crept into a statute that are clearly repugnant to
legislative intent, a court may correct the inadvertence by excising
those words from the statute. 252
If the court can put two constructions upon an ambiguous statute,
it should avoid the one that would cause an injustice. 253 It is a
A lively appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape from
its threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal interpretation
dogma which withholds from the courts available information for reaching
a correct conclusion ....
Id. at 436-37, 343 N.E.2d at 738-39, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21 (citations omitted).
251. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 247, § 46.07, at 110. Sutherland states:
The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if
it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to allow a construction which
will effectuate the legislative intention. The intention prevails over the
letter, and the letter must if possible be read to conform to the spirit
of the act.
Id.
252. See id. § 46.06 at 104 ("words and clauses which are present in a statute
only through inadvertence can be disregarded if they are repugnant to what is found,
on the basis of other indicia, to be the legislative intent"). Sutherland also states:
Courts permit the elimination of words for one or more of the following
reasons: where the word is found in the statute due to the inadvertence
of the legislature, where it is necessary to give the act meaning, effect,
or intelligibility, where apparent from the context of the act that the
word is surplusage, where the use of the word would lead to an absurdity
or irrationality, where the inclusion of the word was a mere inaccuracy,
or clearly apparent mishap, or it was obviously erroneously inserted,
where the use of the word is the result of a typographical or clerical
error, where it is necessary to avoid inconsistencies and to make the
provisions of the act harmonize, where the words of the statute do not
have any useful purpose or are entirely foreign to the subject matter of
the enactment, or where it is apparent from the caption of the act or
body of the bill that the word is surplusage.
Id. § 47.37, at 258 (footnotes omitted).
253. See id. § 45.12, at 54. Sutherland explains:
It has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreason-
ableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible inter-
pretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor
of another which would produce a reasonable result. It is a "well
established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational
and sensible construction." It is fundamental, however, that departure
from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such a con-
struction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would clearly
be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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principle of statutory construction that the law favors a rational and
sensible construction. 254
For instance, the predicate offenses in the present felony murder
statute range from a class A misdemeanor to a class A-I felony. 2"5
For the class A-I felony offenses-first degree kidnapping and first
degree arson-the penalty prescribed for felony murder is the very
same penalty prescribed for the predicate crime.2 6 For the class A
misdemeanor-attempted escape in the second degree-the difference
in the penalties prescribed for felony murder and the predicate offense
is colossal-a difference that has no semblance of proportionality. 25 7
This wide range of predicate offenses offends not only a salient
principle of punishment, that the punishment should fit the crime,
but also a specific purpose of the Penal Code: "To differentiate
on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to
prescribe proportionate penalties therefor. ' ' 258
254. See 1 N.Y. STATUTES LAW § 362 (McKinney 1971).
As a general rule, unless it is fairly evident that a mistake has been
made, the judiciary should not assume the existence of error and change
the plain language of a statute to make it conform to a supposed intent
However, where it is possible to remedy a defect in a statute by con-
struction so as to sustain its validity, the courts will apply a reasonable
construction toward that end to carry out the legislative intent. Thus,
where the legislative intent is plain, and the mistake is clearly due to
inadvertence or clerical error, the courts will adopt a construction which
will remedy the defect in the legislation. Stated differently, if the clear
intent of the legislature is obvious in the statutory history, the court
may supply a word or phrase where an obvious draftsman's error would
otherwise lead to absurd results; and words obviously inserted in a statute
by mistake, will be considered surplusage, and will be disregarded.
Id. Similarly, § 145 provides:
An intent patently absurd is not to be attributed to the Legislature, and
it will be presumed that the Legislature did not intend an absurd result
to ensue from the legislation enacted. In other words, an absurd or
frivolous purpose is not to be attributed to the Legislature, and if a
construction sought to be placed on a statute produces an absurdity it
is, as a general rule, to be discarded.
Id. § 145 (McKinney 1971).
255. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
256. See id.
257. See FLETCHER, supra note 50, at 319.
258. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney Supp. 1987); id. § 125.25 (McKinney
Supp. 1987). This surgery may be mechanically effectuated by adding three words
("or . . . he commits") to the present felony murder statute: "A person is guilty
of murder in the second degree when: . . . 3. Acting either alone or with one or
more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kid-
napping, arson, rape ... sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse,
[or] escape in the first degree, or [he commits] escape in the second degree, and,
in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom,
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In addition, it is clear that New York courts have corrected
legislative errors in the past. For the past century, faulty drafts-
manship has marred New York's felony murder stat-
utes. Nevertheless, courts have corrected these legislative errors
through the judicious use of the canons of statutory construction. 25 9
For example, the court of appeals restricted the language in the
felony murder statute of 1909.260
Similarly, in 1973, the court of appeals, referred to "a fundamental
defect in the old felony-murder statute," and recounted how the
court removed the error by corrective surgery, i.e., judicial excision
of the felony of assault from the face of the statute. 26'
B. Recommendation for the Legislature
New York's present felony murder statute, in enumerating the
predicate crimes, refers to a person who "commits or attempts to
commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree,
sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated
sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second
degree. ' 262 A cursory reading of this provision suggests that the
legislature has enumerated ten felonies. The provision, however,
actually contains thirty-six predicate crimes. 263
To remedy this potential for confusion, the legislature should
amend the felony murder statute by specifically enumerating each
predicate crime (both substantive and attempted) by name, degree
and section number. The legislature should of course omit the mis-
he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other
than one of the participants ... . ." Id.
259. See People v. Fitzgerrold, 37 N.Y. 413 (1868). For example, the 1862 felony
murder statute contained many flaws. The New York Court of Appeals "para-
phrased" the statute in order to give effect to "the evident intent of the framers
of the statute." Id. at 419. The rewriting of the statute, said the Court, was "a
justifiable construction" necessary to carry out "the evident intention of the leg-
islature." Id.
260. See People v. Grieco, 266 N.Y. 48, 193 N.E. 634 (1934) (court limited
scope of former misdemeanor manslaughter rule by not reading literally); see also
People v. Wagner, 245 N.Y. 143, 156 N.E. 644 (1927) (broad inclusive term "any
felony" restrictively interpreted to exclude felonies of assault and carrying dangerous
weapon); People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N.Y. 411, 139 N.E. 558 (1923) (phrase "without
a design to effect death" effectively. excised); People v. Marendi, 213 N.Y. 600, 107
N.E. 1058 (1915) (every essential element of felony must be established by evidence).
261. People v. Miller, 32 N.Y.2d 157, 159, 297 N.E.2d 85, 87, 344 N.Y.S.2d 342,
344 (1973) (assault cannot be proper basis for felony-murder since a fortiori every
homicide occurs during commission of assault).
262. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
263. See id.; supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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demeanors unintentionally included in the current statute. Such an
amendment would clarify the precise crimes that may serve as a
foundation for a felony murder prosecution, 26 and ensure that no
264. Three other penal law provisions enacted after the adoption of the Penal
Law in 1965 illustrate the commendable drafting technique of referring to felony
crimes by name, degree and section number. The first provision is violent felony
offenses. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02 (McKinney Supp. 1987) (added by 1978 N.Y.
Laws ch. 481, § 3, at 861). This provision enumerates each "violent felony" by
name, degree, section number and classification. It expressly addresses the issue of
an attempt to commit a violent felony. For example, § 70.02(1)(b) reads:
Class C violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class
B felonies set forth in paragraph (a); assault in the first degree as defined
in section 120.10, burglary in the second degree as defined in section
140.25, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in section 265.03
and criminal use of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section
265.08.
Id.
The second provision is juvenile offenders. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18)
(McKinney Supp. 1987) (added by 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481, at 827). This provision
enumerates by name, degree, and section number (and, in many instances, the
particular subdivision of a section) the felony that may serve as the foundation
for a prosecution of a juvenile in the adult courts. Like § 70.02, it meticulously
addresses the issue of an attempt to commit a felony by specifically referring to
an attempt to commit two of the 13 designated substantive felonies. For example,
§ 10.00(18) provides, in part:
"Juvenile offender" means ... a person fourteen or fifteen years old
who is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in
... section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the
first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the
first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first dogree); subdivisions one
and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one
and two of section 130.50 (sodomy in the first degree); 130.70 (aggravated
sexual abuse); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of
section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second
degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree); or subdivision two of section
160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter; or defined in this
chapter as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kid-
napping in the first degree.
Id.
The third provision is eavesdropping warrants. See N.Y. CRSm. PROC. LAW § 700.05
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987).
Criminal Procedure Law § 700.05 also enumerates 113 crimes by name and
section number, or, in some cases, the penal law article number wherein the crime is
defined. It expressly and clearly addresses the issue of an attempt to commit one
of the enumerated substantive crimes. Specifically, the attempt must relate to an
enumerated substantive crime that is a felony and, additionally, the attempt itself
must constitute a felony. Thus, with respect to an attempt to commit an enumerated
substantive crime, the latter must be greater than a class E felony. See, e.g., id.
§ 700.05(8). This subdivision states in part:
'Designated offense' means any one or more of the following crimes:
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one reading the law would be left in doubt or uncertainty as to
what predicate conduct may trigger an invocation of the felony
murder doctrine.
More importantly, such an amendment would have the salutory
effect of affording to the legislature an opportunity to give separate
and distinct consideration to each discrete crime that may form the
basis for a felony murder prosecution. Listing each predicate crime
by name, degree and section number may also minimize the likelihood
of a future drafting error that includes a misdemeanor or an un-
intended felony within the statute.
A properly constructed felony murder doctrine is of great im-
portance to the administration of justice. The statute should not
list in an abbreviated, cursory manner the crimes that may serve as
a foundation for a felony murder prosecution. Rather, it should
meticulously specify each and every crime-both substantive and
attempted offenses.
(a) A conspiracy to commit any offense enumerated in the following
paragraphs of this subdivision, or an attempt to commit any felony
enumerated in the following paragraphs of this subdivision which attempt
would itself constitute a felony;
(b) Any of the following felonies: assault in the second degree as
defined in section 120.05 of the penal law, assault in the first degree as
defined in section 120.10 of the penal law, . . . rape in the third degree
as defined in section 130.25 of the penal law, rape in the second degree
as defined in section 130.30 of the penal law, rape in the first degree
as defined in section 130.35 of the penal law, . . . arson in the fourth
degree as defined in section 150.05 of the penal law, arson in the third
degree as defined in section 150.10 of the penal law, arson in the second
degree as defined in section 150.15 of the penal law, arson in the first
degree as defined in section 150.20 of the penal law, . . . escape in the
second degree as defined in section 205.10 of the penal law, escape in
the first degree as defined in section 205.15 of the penal law ....
(c) Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree
as defined in section 220.03 of the penal law, criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the sixth degree as defined in section 220.05 of
the penal law ....
(e) Criminal usury, as defined in article one hundred ninety of the
penal law; ...
(g) Bribing a witness, bribe receiving by a witness, bribing a juror and
bribe receiving by a juror, as defined in article two hundred fifteen of
the penal law;
(h) Promoting prostitution in the first degree, as defined in section
230.32 of the penal law, promoting prostitution in the second degree,
as defined by subdivision one of section 230.30 of the penal law; ...
Id.
Each of the three statutory schemes briefly reviewed refers with maximum spec-
ificity to crimes defined elsewhere.
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IX. Conclusion
The felony murder doctrine has been continually and widely crit-
icized. Its origins are dubious. Many legislative and judicial limi-
tations have circumscribed its operation and the doctrine is unnecessary
for effective and just law, enforcement. More importantly, it erodes
the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. That
relation is vital to a mature and civilized system of criminal justice.
A legislative reconsideration of the existing New York felony murder
doctrine is timely and essential.
The legislature should give serious consideration to the action
taken by Parliament nearly thirty years ago when it abolished the
felony murder doctrine in England. If abolition is deemed to be
impolitic, then New York's felony murder doctrine should be limited
to not more than twenty predicate crimes: the two class A-I felonies
of kidnapping first degree and arson first degree, the nine class B
violent felony offenses, and the nine class C violent felony offenses.
At the very least, the legislature should remove attempted escape in
the second degree from within the ambit of felony murder liability.
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